## Facts

- Jane Doe alleged she had consensual sexual intercourse with Earvin Johnson Jr. in June 1990 and contracted HIV as a result.
- Doe alleged Johnson knew or should have known he was HIV-positive or at substantial risk of infection and failed to disclose that fact.
- Doe alleged Johnson refused to use a condom despite her request.
- Doe sought damages for physical, emotional, and financial harms allegedly resulting from HIV infection.
- Infant Doe, through a next friend, asserted a loss-of-consortium claim based on the effects of Jane Doe’s infection.
- The defendant moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss several tort counts and alternatively sought a more definite statement (Rule 12(e)) and to strike allegedly prejudicial language (Rule 12(f)).

## Issues

1. Whether a person has a tort duty to disclose HIV-positive status (or significant indicia of infection) to a sexual partner, and whether “high-risk” or “sexually active” behavior alone can create that duty.
2. Whether the complaint stated legally sufficient claims for negligence, battery, fraud based on nondisclosure, strict liability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
3. Whether consensual sexual intercourse can be treated as an abnormally dangerous activity supporting strict liability for HIV transmission.
4. Whether the pleadings were so vague that a more definite statement was required, and whether certain descriptive terms should be stricken as scandalous or prejudicial.

## Decision

- The court dismissed the strict liability claim, holding that consensual sexual intercourse is not an abnormally dangerous activity for strict-liability purposes.
- The court declined to dismiss negligence and certain nondisclosure-based theories at the pleading stage where liability was tied to actual or constructive knowledge of infection and failure to take reasonable precautions.
- The court permitted a battery theory to proceed on the premise that consent may be ineffective if obtained without disclosure of a serious sexually transmitted disease, contingent on proving the defendant’s knowledge or constructive knowledge.
- The court allowed fraud and IIED theories to proceed only to the extent grounded in specific, material concealment or extreme conduct connected to known or strongly indicated infection, and required greater specificity for some allegations.
- The court granted in part a more definite statement to clarify the basis for alleging knowledge/constructive knowledge and the particulars of the fraud-based omissions.
- The court addressed the motion to strike by limiting prejudicial descriptors to allegations relevant to risk, foreseeability, and knowledge, rather than allowing gratuitous characterizations.

## Legal Principles

- A duty to warn or disclose to a sexual partner may arise when a person has actual knowledge of HIV infection or constructive knowledge based on concrete indicia (e.g., symptoms, prior testing, or information about a partner’s diagnosis).
- High-risk sexual behavior or a generalized “sexually active” lifestyle, without more, does not by itself establish a legal duty to disclose infection risk.
- Negligence may be stated where the pleadings plausibly allege knowledge or constructive knowledge of infection and a failure to exercise reasonable care through warnings and protective measures.
- Battery may be viable where nondisclosure of a serious sexually transmitted disease renders consent uninformed and the transmission constitutes harmful contact.
- Strict liability is not an appropriate theory for HIV transmission through consensual intercourse because the activity is not classified as abnormally dangerous under strict-liability doctrine.
- Fraud and IIED claims based on nondisclosure require specific allegations identifying the material facts concealed or misrepresented and the conduct said to be extreme and outrageous.

## Conclusion

The court largely allowed tort claims based on alleged nondisclosure and exposure to HIV to proceed beyond the pleadings where tied to actual or constructive knowledge of infection and failure to take reasonable precautions, but rejected strict liability and required more specific allegations to define the scope of fraud- and IIED-based theories.


Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993)