## Facts

- Jane Doe and John Doe, enrolled members of the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe, planned a voluntary, private adoption of their infant (Baby Doe), who was eligible for tribal membership.
- The Does sought to keep the child’s birth and adoption secret from their families, community, and the Band.
- Minnesota’s Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA) required notice to the child’s tribe in adoption proceedings involving an “Indian child,” permitted tribal intervention, and allowed tribal access to adoption records that would otherwise be confidential.
- The Does alleged MIFPA would compel disclosure of highly personal information in the adoption file (including medical and criminal history) to the Band, causing embarrassment, social pressure, and potential retaliation.
- The Does filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Minnesota officials in their official capacities seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of MIFPA’s notice, intervention, and record-access provisions as applied to their adoption.

## Issues

1. Whether the Does had Article III standing to seek prospective relief against state officials based on alleged compelled disclosure and tribal intervention risks under MIFPA.
2. Whether the dispute was moot, or instead fit the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception while the adoption was ongoing.
3. Whether later developments rendered the action moot, requiring dismissal without reaching the constitutional merits.
4. (Unreached) Whether MIFPA’s notice, intervention, and record-access provisions, as applied to voluntary adoptions, violated substantive due process or informational privacy protections.

## Decision

- The court denied a preliminary injunction (2015), concluding the Does had not shown irreparable harm because the state adoption court could protect confidentiality and the Band had agreed not to intervene in that adoption.
- In 2016, the court held the Does had standing and that the case was not moot at that time because it was capable of repetition yet evading review; it also held the DHS Commissioner and the Attorney General were proper official-capacity defendants for prospective relief.
- In 2017, on cross-motions for summary judgment, the court dismissed the action as moot and declined to decide the constitutional challenges to MIFPA.

## Legal Principles

- Article III standing requires a concrete and imminent injury that is fairly traceable to defendants and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.
- A case may avoid mootness if the challenged conduct is capable of repetition yet evading review, but the exception does not apply where future recurrence is too speculative once the underlying controversy ends.
- Federal courts will not decide constitutional questions absent a live case or controversy; when a case becomes moot, courts must dismiss without reaching the merits.
- In official-capacity suits for prospective relief, state officials with responsibility connected to enforcement may be proper defendants.

## Conclusion

The court permitted the § 1983 challenge to proceed past threshold objections in 2016 by finding standing and rejecting mootness at that stage, but ultimately dismissed the action as moot in 2017 after the adoption concluded and no ongoing, non-speculative controversy remained, leaving the constitutional questions unresolved.


Doe v. Piper, 165 F. Supp. 3d 789 (D. Minn. 2016)