## Facts

- Jane Doe (a minor) and Jason Smith (also a minor) were in a dating relationship in Illinois.
- During a consensual sexual encounter, Smith secretly used a hidden video camera to record Doe without her knowledge or consent.
- After the relationship ended, Smith circulated the video at their high school; Doe alleged the dissemination widened through electronic sharing, including online posting.
- Doe sued in federal court asserting a federal civil claim under the federal wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (including a damages action under § 2520), and related Illinois tort claims under supplemental jurisdiction (including eavesdropping, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and battery).
- The district court dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), reasoning that the complaint did not expressly allege an “interception” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).

## Issues

1. Whether a federal complaint must expressly plead facts tracking each statutory element of a wiretap claim, including that the challenged recording was an “interception” under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
2. Whether omission of the term “interception” (or equivalent element-labeling language) warrants dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) despite factual allegations describing surreptitious recording and disclosure.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held that Rule 8 requires a short and plain statement giving fair notice of the claim, not element-by-element pleading.
- The court concluded that the complaint’s factual narrative sufficiently informed Smith of the conduct challenged and the basis for relief, even without using the word “interception.”
- Whether the alleged conduct satisfies the statutory definition of “interception” was treated as a merits question for later stages, not a pleading prerequisite.

## Legal Principles

- Under Rule 8, a plaintiff is not required to plead facts corresponding to each element of a statutory cause of action; the complaint must state a claim for relief and give fair notice of what the defendant is accused of doing.
- A complaint generally need not plead law or identify the correct legal theory with precision; detailed legal and factual development can occur through later litigation procedures.
- Particularized pleading is required only for the limited categories identified in Rule 9(b) and similar doctrines; absent such a requirement, courts should not impose special word-choice demands as a condition of surviving a motion to dismiss.
- Dismissal is improper where the complaint plainly describes the alleged wrongdoing and the defendant can reasonably prepare a response, even if a contested statutory definition may later control liability.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit reinstated Doe’s suit, holding that federal notice pleading does not require a plaintiff to recite statutory element labels such as “interception” when the complaint’s factual allegations clearly describe the challenged conduct and give the defendant fair notice of the claim.


Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2005)