Facts
- Jane Doe, a Florida convenience-store clerk, was sexually assaulted while working alone at a store owned and operated by Southland Corporation.
- Jere William Thompson, a Texas resident, served as Southland’s president and CEO.
- Doe sued Thompson personally for gross negligence, alleging he failed to ensure adequate security measures for the Florida store.
- Doe sought to establish personal jurisdiction over Thompson under Florida’s long-arm statute, § 48.193 (1987), based on alleged acts or omissions tied to store security.
- Thompson moved to quash service and to dismiss/abate for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting any relevant conduct occurred in Texas in his corporate capacity and not as individual, in-state conduct.
Issues
- Whether Florida’s long-arm statute, § 48.193 (1987), permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate officer based on alleged negligence arising from corporate managerial decisions, absent qualifying acts personally performed by the officer in Florida.
- What procedural steps govern jurisdictional challenges when the defendant contests jurisdictional facts by affidavit.
Decision
- The Florida Supreme Court approved the district court’s decision and held Florida courts lacked personal jurisdiction over Thompson.
- The Court directed that Thompson’s motions to quash service of process and to abate/dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction should be granted.
- The Court applied the two-step jurisdiction framework requiring (1) statutory authorization under § 48.193 and (2) constitutional minimum contacts, and resolved the case at the statutory step.
Legal Principles
- Florida courts must first determine whether the pleadings and proof bring the defendant within the specific acts enumerated in Florida’s long-arm statute; if the statute does not reach the defendant, jurisdiction fails without reaching due process.
- The long-arm statute requires that the defendant personally commit the jurisdiction-triggering act; a corporate officer is not subject to Florida jurisdiction merely because the corporation does business in Florida.
- Acts performed in a corporate capacity from out of state do not, without more, constitute the officer’s personal in-state acts for purposes of § 48.193.
- When a defendant contests jurisdictional allegations by affidavit, the plaintiff must respond with a counter-affidavit; if the affidavits conflict on material jurisdictional facts, the trial court must conduct a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve the dispute.
Conclusion
Florida’s long-arm statute did not authorize personal jurisdiction over a nonresident CEO based solely on alleged failures in corporate security policy affecting Florida stores, because the statute requires qualifying acts personally attributable to the officer as an individual within its enumerated grounds.