## Facts

- The University of Michigan, a public university, adopted a 1988 policy addressing discrimination and discriminatory harassment after reports of increased racial intolerance on campus.
- The policy authorized discipline for conduct, including “verbal conduct” or “verbal behavior,” that “stigmatiz[ed] or victimiz[ed]” individuals based on protected characteristics and that created an “intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment” in university settings.
- Sanctions could range from reprimand to expulsion, and decisionmakers could impose remedial requirements such as attendance in educational programs.
- The policy applied in academic settings, including classroom discussions; it had been invoked in at least one classroom-related incident involving comments about homosexuality and counseling.
- “John Doe,” a graduate psychology student, wished to discuss academic theories about biological differences among sexes and races and feared the policy could be used to discipline such speech.
- Doe sued in federal court seeking a permanent injunction against enforcement of the policy provisions regulating speech; he did not seek to bar regulation of non-speech physical conduct.

## Issues

1. Whether the university policy regulating “verbal conduct” is unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it is overbroad and chills protected speech.
2. Whether the policy is unconstitutionally vague due to undefined, subjective terms that fail to provide fair notice and invite arbitrary enforcement.
3. Whether injunctive relief should extend to the policy’s regulation of physical conduct as well as its regulation of speech.

## Decision

- The court held the policy’s speech-related provisions unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their enforcement.
- The court found the policy overbroad because it reached a substantial amount of speech protected by the First Amendment, including controversial academic discussion in classrooms.
- The court found the policy unconstitutionally vague because operative terms such as “stigmatize” and “victimize” lacked clear standards, creating uncertainty and risk of arbitrary enforcement.
- The court denied injunctive relief as to the policy’s regulation of physical conduct, concluding the university could regulate discriminatory harassment insofar as it constitutes conduct or otherwise falls within established exceptions to protected expression.

## Legal Principles

- A public university, as a state actor, is bound by the First Amendment when regulating student expression.
- A regulation is overbroad if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech in relation to its legitimate sweep, particularly where it chills core academic and political expression.
- A regulation is void for vagueness if it fails to provide fair notice of what is prohibited or grants officials unbounded discretion that risks arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
- Government may not suppress speech merely because it is offensive, hurtful, or discriminatory in viewpoint or content, absent narrow categories of unprotected speech or conduct-based harassment.
- Universities may regulate physical harassment and other non-expressive misconduct, but speech restrictions must be narrowly drawn and clearly defined.

## Conclusion

The court enjoined enforcement of the university’s harassment policy to the extent it punished “verbal conduct” using broad and undefined terms that chilled protected academic speech, while allowing the university to regulate discriminatory harassment when addressed through physical conduct rules and other constitutionally permissible limits.


Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989)