## Facts

- James Paul Doherty enrolled at a private optometry school and disclosed retinitis pigmentosa (severely restricted visual fields) but did not disclose an associated neurological disorder affecting motor skills and coordination.
- Before admission, a faculty examiner reported Doherty’s vision had stabilized and opined he should be able to handle academic work; a separate physician’s more cautious assessment of the neurological condition was not received by the school.
- After Doherty matriculated, the school implemented a new graduation requirement: demonstrated clinical proficiency using four specified instruments, including the direct ophthalmoscope and slit lamp, viewed as fundamental to competent optometric practice.
- Doherty received extra time and repeated opportunities to meet the clinical proficiency requirement but could not master the required techniques.
- The school refused to award Doherty a degree based on his failure to satisfy the clinical proficiency requirement.
- Doherty sued alleging (1) disability discrimination under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, (2) breach of contract based on catalog-based expectations that requirements would not change, and (3) misrepresentation based on alleged assurances about his ability to complete the program.
- The district court dismissed the § 504 claim, directed a verdict for the school on misrepresentation, and sent the contract claim to the jury, which returned a verdict for Doherty and awarded damages.
- Doherty appealed the § 504 dismissal and misrepresentation ruling; the school cross-appealed the contract verdict.

## Issues

1. Whether Doherty was “otherwise qualified” under § 504 when he could not meet essential clinical proficiency requirements, and whether denial of the degree constituted unlawful discrimination.
2. Whether the school breached a contractual obligation by adding and enforcing a new clinical proficiency graduation requirement despite catalog language reserving the right to modify curriculum and requirements.
3. Whether statements by school personnel about Doherty’s prospects constituted actionable misrepresentations under Tennessee law rather than nonactionable opinions or predictions.

## Decision

- Affirmed dismissal of the § 504 claim because Doherty was not “otherwise qualified” to complete the program given his inability to meet essential clinical standards.
- Reversed the jury verdict for Doherty on breach of contract and directed entry of judgment for the school because the catalog reserved the right to change requirements and no enforceable promise froze graduation requirements at matriculation.
- Affirmed the directed verdict for the school on misrepresentation because the challenged statements were professional opinions about potential success, not false statements of present material fact.

## Legal Principles

- Under § 504, a plaintiff must be “otherwise qualified,” meaning able to meet a program’s essential requirements with or without reasonable accommodation that does not fundamentally alter the program.
- A professional school is not required by § 504 to lower or substantially modify legitimate competency-based standards that are necessary for safe and effective practice.
- Academic catalogs may be part of an implied student–institution contract, but explicit reservations of the right to change curriculum and requirements generally defeat claims based solely on subsequent requirement changes.
- Under Tennessee misrepresentation law, liability generally requires a false statement of present material fact; opinions, predictions, and optimistic assessments about future performance are not actionable absent proof of knowing falsity.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit held that the optometry school lawfully denied a degree to a student who, despite accommodations, could not satisfy essential clinical proficiency requirements; it also held that the school’s reserved right to modify degree requirements defeated the contract claim and that alleged assurances of success were nonactionable opinions.


Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988)