## Facts

- Barbara and Don Dornfeld pulled onto the shoulder of Highway 61 after a flat tire; Don exited to change the tire while Barbara stayed in the passenger seat with flashers on.
- Scott Lee Oberg, driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.224, struck Don and dragged his body over 200 feet; Don died at the scene.
- Barbara felt but did not see the impact and then learned immediately that her husband had been killed; she later developed post-traumatic stress disorder.
- Barbara sued Oberg and his insurer for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), including reckless infliction.

## Issues

1. Whether a bystander in the zone of danger may recover for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress when the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was not directed at the plaintiff or at the deceased family member as a specific target.
2. Whether generalized reckless conduct such as drunk driving satisfies Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(2)’s requirement for bystander IIED liability.

## Decision

- The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.
- It held that no cause of action existed on these facts for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress under Restatement § 46(2).
- The jury’s award for reckless/intentional infliction of emotional distress was vacated, and the case was remanded for disposition consistent with the reversal.

## Legal Principles

- IIED requires extreme and outrageous conduct, intentional or reckless causation, and severe emotional distress; Minnesota construes the tort narrowly.
- For bystander recovery under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(2), the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct must be directed at a specific person (the third party or, in appropriate cases, the plaintiff), not at the public generally.
- “Reckless” within § 46 is treated within the intentional-tort framework and contemplates a deliberate act directed at someone, not merely negligent creation of generalized risk.
- Courts should not use IIED/reckless infliction to bypass Minnesota’s more restrictive NIED framework (including the zone-of-danger and physical-manifestation requirements for negligence-based emotional distress claims).
- Extending IIED to cover generalized reckless driving would risk open-ended liability to a broad class of claimants.

## Conclusion

Because Oberg’s drunk driving, though extreme and reckless, was not directed at Barbara or Don Dornfeld as particular individuals, Minnesota law did not permit bystander recovery for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress under Restatement § 46(2), and the emotional-distress verdict for Barbara was reversed.


Dornfeld v. Oberg, 503 N.W.2d 115 (Minn. 1993)