## Facts

- More than 1,000 Nicaraguan citizens alleged they were injured by exposure to DBCP, a pesticide used in agricultural work.
- The Nicaraguans sued Dow Chemical Company, Shell Oil Company, and Shell Chemical Company in Nicaragua under Nicaraguan Special Law 364.
- Law 364 imposed requirements on foreign defendants, including either posting a substantial deposit in Nicaragua or submitting unconditionally to U.S. court jurisdiction for enforcement purposes.
- Dow and Shell filed a federal declaratory-judgment action in the Central District of California against the Nicaraguan plaintiffs seeking declarations that (1) they were not liable for DBCP injuries and (2) any contrary Nicaraguan judgments were unenforceable in the United States.
- The Nicaraguans moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; Dow and Shell argued jurisdiction existed based on the Nicaraguans’ “consent” arising from Law 364 and from the Nicaraguans’ participation in related federal litigation involving different corporate defendants.

## Issues

1. Whether the Nicaraguans consented to personal jurisdiction in the federal declaratory action by suing in Nicaragua under Special Law 364.
2. Whether the Nicaraguans consented to personal jurisdiction in this action by defending a similar declaratory action in the same federal district brought by a different company concerning related Nicaraguan judgments.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.
- Suing under Special Law 364 did not constitute the Nicaraguans’ consent to be sued in a U.S. declaratory action by Dow and Shell.
- Defending a similar declaratory action brought by a different company did not amount to consent to personal jurisdiction in a separate action by different plaintiffs.
- Because no valid consent theory applied and no other jurisdictional contacts were shown, the federal court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the Nicaraguan defendants.

## Legal Principles

- Consent to personal jurisdiction must be clear; waiver of the personal-jurisdiction defense is not lightly inferred.
- A foreign statute’s conditions directed at defendants do not, without explicit indication, create plaintiffs’ consent to be haled into U.S. court in an independent declaratory action.
- Personal jurisdiction based on litigation conduct is proceeding-specific; defending one case does not create blanket consent to suit by different parties in a separate action, even if related factually.
- Absent consent or sufficient minimum contacts supporting specific or general jurisdiction, a federal court must dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit held that neither the Nicaraguan plaintiffs’ use of Special Law 364 nor their participation in separate, related federal litigation established consent to personal jurisdiction in California, so the declaratory-judgment action was properly dismissed.


Dow Chem. Co. v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2005)