Facts
- Maxwell was a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and led a car with other UVF members to a pub.
- He was unaware of the exact nature of the crime planned by the main offenders, which could have been a bombing, shooting, or another violent attack.
- Maxwell claimed he believed the plan was only to make a threat, not to carry out an attack.
- The main offence that occurred was a bombing of the pub.
- The case considered whether Maxwell could be held liable as a secondary party for the bombing, despite not knowing in advance the specific method that would be used.
Issues
- What level of knowledge or mental state is required for secondary liability when the secondary party does not know the precise acts the principal offender intends?
- Is it sufficient for secondary liability that the secondary party contemplates and intends to aid or encourage a range of possible offences, even if unaware of the exact act committed?
Decision
- The House of Lords held that a secondary party does not need to know the exact method by which the principal offence will be committed.
- It is sufficient if the secondary party contemplates a range of possible acts (such as bombing, shooting, or other forms of violent attack), and intentionally aids or encourages the commission of any act within that range.
- The range considered must not be "too wide" but must include the "type" of act actually done.
- Maxwell was found liable because the bombing fell within the contemplated set of possible offences.
Legal Principles
- Secondary liability for assisting or encouraging a crime does not require knowledge of the specific method to be used by the principal offender.
- The mental state required is intentional assistance or encouragement of acts falling within a contemplated range of possible offences.
- Purpose or intent to aid or encourage a possible offence is required; mere suspicion or knowledge is insufficient.
- The liability is limited to acts within the category or “type” of conduct that the secondary party had intentionally supported.
- Subsequent cases have further clarified that proof of intent, rather than suspicion, determines liability (as reaffirmed in later cases such as R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8).
Conclusion
DPP NI v Maxwell established that for secondary liability, intentional assistance or encouragement towards a contemplated range of offences is sufficient, provided the actual offence committed falls within that range; specific knowledge of the exact act is not required, and purpose remains central to liability.