DPP NI v Maxwell [1978] 1 WLR 1350 (HL)

Facts

• Maxwell was a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and led a car with other UVF members to a pub.
• He was unaware of the exact nature of the crime planned by the main offenders, which could have been a bombing, shooting, or another violent attack.
• Maxwell claimed he believed the plan was only to make a threat, not to carry out an attack.
• The main offence that occurred was a bombing of the pub.
• The case considered whether Maxwell could be held liable as a secondary party for the bombing, despite not knowing in advance the specific method that would be used.

Issues

1. What level of knowledge or mental state is required for secondary liability when the secondary party does not know the precise acts the principal offender intends?
2. Is it sufficient for secondary liability that the secondary party contemplates and intends to aid or encourage a range of possible offences, even if unaware of the exact act committed?

Decision

• The House of Lords held that a secondary party does not need to know the exact method by which the principal offence will be committed.
• It is sufficient if the secondary party contemplates a range of possible acts (such as bombing, shooting, or other forms of violent attack), and intentionally aids or encourages the commission of any act within that range.
• The range considered must not be "too wide" but must include the "type" of act actually done.
• Maxwell was found liable because the bombing fell within the contemplated set of possible offences.

Legal Principles

• Secondary liability for assisting or encouraging a crime does not require knowledge of the specific method to be used by the principal offender.
• The mental state required is intentional assistance or encouragement of acts falling within a contemplated range of possible offences.
• Purpose or intent to aid or encourage a possible offence is required; mere suspicion or knowledge is insufficient.
• The liability is limited to acts within the category or “type” of conduct that the secondary party had intentionally supported.
• Subsequent cases have further clarified that proof of intent, rather than suspicion, determines liability (as reaffirmed in later cases such as R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8).

Conclusion

DPP NI v Maxwell established that for secondary liability, intentional assistance or encouragement towards a contemplated range of offences is sufficient, provided the actual offence committed falls within that range; specific knowledge of the exact act is not required, and purpose remains central to liability.