Facts
- Morgan, a Royal Air Force pilot, invited several friends to have sexual intercourse with his wife, telling them that any resistance or protest from her was not genuine and that she derived pleasure from such acts.
- Relying on Morgan's assurances, the friends engaged in sexual activity with Morgan's wife, who resisted and did not consent.
- The friends were convicted of rape, and Morgan was convicted of aiding and abetting rape.
- At trial, the defendants argued that they genuinely believed Morgan's wife had consented to the intercourse, despite her resistance.
- Their convictions formed the basis for an appeal addressing the significance of a defendant’s belief in consent.
Issues
- Whether an honest belief by the defendant in the complainant’s consent to sexual intercourse, even if unreasonable, can constitute a valid defence to rape.
- Whether, for the purpose of negating mens rea for rape, the relevant standard is a subjective belief in consent or an objective reasonableness requirement.
- Whether the trial judge’s direction to the jury—requiring the belief in consent to be reasonable—constituted a misdirection warranting reversal of the convictions.
Decision
- The House of Lords held that an honest belief in consent, even if unreasonable, constitutes a valid defence to rape.
- The focus in law is on the actual, subjective mental state of the defendant rather than an objective standard of what a reasonable person would have believed.
- The court found that the necessary mens rea for rape is absent if the defendant genuinely believes the complainant was consenting, regardless of whether that belief was reasonable.
- Despite this legal principle, the convictions were upheld because, given the evidence, no reasonable jury could have found that the defendants genuinely believed in the complainant’s consent, and a different outcome would not have been likely even upon proper direction.
Legal Principles
- The mens rea for rape requires proof that the defendant either knew the complainant was not consenting or was reckless as to whether consent was present.
- An honest, if unreasonable, belief in consent is capable of negating the mens rea for rape under the prevailing common law at the time.
- Jury directions must focus on the defendant's subjective state of mind, not on whether the belief in consent was reasonable.
- While this test was subsequently criticized, and statutory reform later introduced a requirement for reasonableness in the defendant’s belief, the subjective standard established in Morgan was binding at the time of the decision.
Conclusion
DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 (HL) established that an honest belief in consent, even if unreasonable, could provide a defence to rape by negating the required mens rea, although this standard has since been modified by later statutory reforms introducing reasonableness into the assessment of belief in consent.
