## Facts

- Three related matters were decided together by the New York Court of Appeals: Dreger (against the New York State Thruway Authority) and companion matters Charbonneau and Dalton (against the State of New York and/or the Thruway Authority).
- Each claimant filed a claim within the applicable statutory time limits but failed to complete service on the New York Attorney General in the manner required by Court of Claims Act § 11.
- In **Dreger**, the claimant served the Thruway Authority but did not serve the Attorney General.
- In **Charbonneau** and **Dalton**, the claimants mailed copies of their claims to the Attorney General, but not by the statutorily required certified mail (return receipt requested).
- The Court of Claims dismissed each action based on noncompliance with Court of Claims Act § 11’s service requirements.
- After dismissal, the ordinary limitation periods had expired, leaving the claims time-barred unless the claimants could recommence under CPLR 205(a) (invoked through Court of Claims Act provisions that incorporate CPLR time-limit rules).

## Issues

1. Whether claims dismissed for failure to serve the Attorney General as required by Court of Claims Act § 11 were “timely commenced” within the meaning of CPLR 205(a).
2. Whether CPLR 205(a)’s six-month saving provision permits recommencement in the Court of Claims when the initial claim was filed on time but service on the Attorney General was missing or defective.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division orders in all matters, with costs.
- The Court held the prior actions were **not “timely commenced”** for CPLR 205(a) purposes because the claimants did not serve the Attorney General in the manner Court of Claims Act § 11 requires.
- Because the initial actions were not timely commenced, CPLR 205(a) did not permit recommencement after the limitations periods expired.
- The Court stated the outcome did not depend on labeling the service defect as subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or a condition precedent; the controlling point was failure to satisfy the statutory requirement tied to commencement.

## Legal Principles

- In Court of Claims practice, service on the Attorney General in the manner specified by Court of Claims Act § 11 is required to properly commence a claim against the State (and similarly governed claims against the Thruway Authority).
- CPLR 205(a) is available in Court of Claims matters only if the earlier action was “timely commenced,” which requires compliance with the statutory commencement requirements applicable to the Court of Claims.
- Filing within the limitations period, without proper service on the Attorney General under § 11, does not produce a “timely commenced” action for CPLR 205(a).
- The availability of CPLR-based recommencement through Court of Claims Act provisions does not excuse noncompliance with § 11’s service method requirements.
- The characterization of the defect (subject matter jurisdiction versus other categories) does not change the CPLR 205(a) analysis where the statutory commencement requirement was not satisfied.

## Conclusion

Because the claimants did not serve the Attorney General as Court of Claims Act § 11 requires—either by failing to serve the Attorney General at all or by using an improper mailing method—their actions were not “timely commenced,” and CPLR 205(a) could not be used to restart the claims after the limitations periods had expired.


Dreger v. New York State Thruway Authority, 81 N.Y.2d 721, 593 N.Y.S.2d 758, 609 N.E.2d 111 (1992)