Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)

Facts

  • Dun & Bradstreet, a commercial credit-reporting agency, issued a confidential credit report to five subscribers stating that Greenmoss Builders, a small Vermont contractor, had filed for bankruptcy.
  • The bankruptcy statement was false and materially misrepresented Greenmoss’s financial condition.
  • The error originated from a mistaken report prepared by a teenage student working for Dun & Bradstreet.
  • Subscription contracts barred subscribers from further disseminating the report, limiting its audience to a small group of business users.
  • After complaint, Dun & Bradstreet sent a correction to the same subscribers stating that the bankruptcy involved a former employee, not Greenmoss, and that Greenmoss continued operating.
  • Greenmoss sued for defamation under state law and sought compensatory (including presumed) and punitive damages.
  • A jury awarded $350,000; the trial court granted a new trial based on the view that presumed and punitive damages required proof of actual malice under constitutional limits.
  • The Vermont Supreme Court reinstated the verdict; the U.S. Supreme Court granted review.

Issues

  1. Whether the First Amendment requires proof of actual malice before a private-figure plaintiff may recover presumed and punitive damages for defamation when the speech does not involve a matter of public concern.
  2. Whether the false, confidential credit report about Greenmoss concerned a matter of public concern.

Decision

  • The Court affirmed the reinstatement of the jury’s award.
  • A plurality held that, when defamatory statements do not involve matters of public concern, the First Amendment permits presumed and punitive damages without proof of actual malice.
  • The plurality concluded the credit report involved no public concern because it addressed the financial status of a single business and was distributed to a small, contractually restricted audience.
  • The plurality rejected basing constitutional protection on a media/nonmedia classification, focusing instead on whether the speech was of public or private concern.
  • Speech on matters of public concern receives stronger First Amendment protection than speech on purely private matters; the constitutional value of private-concern speech is reduced.
  • For defamation involving private-concern speech, states may allow presumed and punitive damages without requiring proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth.
  • Whether speech is of public concern is assessed by its content, form, and context, viewed as a whole, including the scope of dissemination and intended audience.
  • Confidential, profit-motivated business communications directed to a limited audience may be treated as private-concern speech for First Amendment purposes.

Conclusion

The Court held that a private plaintiff may recover presumed and punitive damages for defamatory falsehoods without proving actual malice when the speech is not of public concern, and it treated a narrowly distributed, confidential credit report about a single contractor’s financial status as private-concern speech.