## Facts

- Sandra Dunlea alleged that her natural father, Howard Dappen, sexually abused her while she lived with him in California between 1961 and 1964, when she was 14 to 17 years old, and that she also had earlier memories beginning around age five.
- In 1964, Dunlea reported the abuse to a California Highway Patrol officer; after an investigation she was removed from Dappen’s custody and placed in foster care, and Dappen was not prosecuted.
- Dunlea alleged she always remembered at least some of the abuse, but did not connect her later psychological conditions (including depression and suicidal ideation) to the abuse until 1991.
- In 1991, after Dunlea learned that Dappen remained angry about “what happened in 1964,” she called him to confront him; he angrily stated he would never forgive her for what she did to him.
- After the 1991 confrontation, Dunlea entered therapy and asserted she then discovered the causal link between the childhood abuse and her psychological injuries.
- In 1992, Dunlea sued Dappen in Hawaiʻi circuit court for childhood sexual abuse (CSA), defamation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (IIED/NIED).
- The circuit court dismissed the CSA claim with prejudice as time-barred, later granted summary judgment to Dappen on defamation and IIED/NIED, and entered final judgment for Dappen.

## Issues

1. Whether a CSA claim may accrue under a discovery rule when the plaintiff knew of the abusive acts but alleges delayed discovery of the causal connection between the abuse and later psychological injury, making timeliness a question for the trier of fact.
2. Whether Dappen was entitled to summary judgment on defamation based on his 1991 statements that he would never forgive Dunlea for what she did to him.
3. Whether Dappen was entitled to summary judgment on IIED and NIED arising from the 1991 statements and related conduct.
4. What limits and considerations govern discovery into a plaintiff’s psychological history and expert evidence when the CSA claim and limitations defense proceed to trial.

## Decision

- The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
- The court vacated the dismissal of the CSA claim and remanded for trial, holding that the discovery-rule timeliness question generally belongs to the trier of fact on Dunlea’s allegations.
- The court affirmed summary judgment for Dappen on the defamation claim.
- The court affirmed summary judgment for Dappen on the IIED and NIED claims.
- Because the CSA claim was remanded, the court provided guidance on handling related discovery disputes on remand.

## Legal Principles

- In CSA cases, accrual under a discovery rule may turn on when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that present psychological injuries were caused by earlier abuse, not solely on when the plaintiff knew of the abusive acts.
- Repressed memory is not a prerequisite to discovery-rule analysis in CSA claims; delayed causal awareness can be sufficient to raise a triable limitations issue.
- When delayed causal discovery is plausibly alleged, determining the time of discovery and reasonable diligence is ordinarily a fact question not suitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss.
- Statements that function as expressions of anger or opinion in a private dispute, without a provably false factual assertion causing cognizable reputational harm, are not actionable defamation.
- IIED requires conduct sufficiently extreme to meet the “outrageous” threshold; NIED requires a legally cognizable basis for negligence-based emotional distress, and distress tied to historic abuse is addressed through the underlying tort claim rather than re-labeled through separate distress claims based on later non-tortious statements.
- On remand in CSA cases where causation and delayed discovery are contested, psychological records and expert testimony may be relevant, but discovery should be limited to what is reasonably necessary and tailored to account for privacy interests.

## Conclusion

The court reinstated Dunlea’s CSA claim, holding that alleged delayed discovery of the causal link between abuse and psychological injury typically creates a fact issue on limitations, while leaving in place judgment for Dappen on defamation and emotional distress claims based on the 1991 statements and directing careful, tailored discovery on remand.


Dunlea v. Dappen, 924 P.2d 196 (Haw. 1996)