## Facts

- Walter Bachowski lost an election for union office in the United Steelworkers of America.
- After exhausting internal union remedies, Bachowski filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging violations of LMRDA § 401.
- Under LMRDA § 402(b), the Secretary investigated and decided a civil action to set aside the election was “not warranted.”
- Bachowski sued to challenge the refusal to sue as arbitrary and capricious and sought to compel the Secretary to file an enforcement action.
- The district court dismissed for lack of authority to review the refusal.
- The Third Circuit reversed, holding there was jurisdiction and that the Secretary’s decision was reviewable under the APA, and it contemplated probing the decision’s factual basis.

## Issues

1. Whether federal district courts have jurisdiction and authority under the APA to review the Secretary of Labor’s decision not to bring a civil action under LMRDA § 402(b) to set aside a union election.
2. If review is available, whether it permits trial-type factual inquiry into the basis for the Secretary’s nonenforcement decision, or is limited to arbitrariness review based on the Secretary’s stated reasons and administrative materials.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1337 provided jurisdiction to hear the challenge to the Secretary’s refusal to sue under the LMRDA.
- The Secretary’s decision not to file suit was “final agency action” reviewable under APA §§ 702 and 704 and not exempt under APA § 701(a).
- The Court held review is available under APA § 706(2)(A) to determine whether the refusal was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
- The Court required the Secretary to provide a sufficiently specific statement of reasons to permit meaningful review.
- The Court rejected trial-type judicial inquiry into the factual bases for the refusal; review must not become de novo fact-finding that would effectively create a private enforcement action.

## Legal Principles

- Agency nonenforcement decisions are presumptively subject to judicial review absent clear congressional intent to preclude review.
- A statute’s centralization of enforcement authority in an agency official does not, without express language, bar all judicial oversight of nonenforcement decisions.
- The APA “committed to agency discretion by law” exception does not apply where the statutory scheme supplies enough “law to apply” to test for arbitrariness or caprice.
- When judicial review is available, the agency must provide a reasoned statement of the factors relied upon so a court can apply APA § 706(2)(A).
- In this setting, the reviewing court’s role is limited to evaluating the stated reasons and supporting administrative materials; it may not conduct a trial-like inquiry into the underlying merits of the complaint.

## Conclusion

The Court permitted limited APA review of the Secretary of Labor’s refusal to sue under LMRDA § 402(b), requiring a reasoned statement of decision, while barring trial-type factual litigation that would undermine Congress’s choice to vest exclusive enforcement authority in the Secretary.


Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975)