## Facts

- After a workplace retirement party, Emerson W. Dunton, Jr. accompanied coworker Angela Pfeiffer to her car; the parties disputed whether Dunton’s conduct was consensual or an unwanted advance.
- Angela’s husband, Suffolk County police officer Robert Pfeiffer, arrived in a patrol vehicle, pulled Dunton from the car, repeatedly struck him, and left him in the parking lot; Dunton sustained nonpermanent injuries.
- Angela filed a criminal complaint charging Dunton with third-degree sexual abuse under New York law; Dunton was arrested.
- The criminal case was dismissed on statutory speedy-trial grounds after the prosecution failed to proceed within the required time.
- Dunton sued Suffolk County, the Suffolk County Police Department, Robert and Angela Pfeiffer, and unnamed officers, asserting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and pendent state claims including battery and malicious prosecution.
- The Suffolk County Attorney represented both the County and Robert Pfeiffer; the County’s trial position emphasized Robert acted as a private “irate husband,” which protected the County but weakened Robert’s potential defenses.
- The district court dismissed the claims against the County and police department and dismissed the federal claims against Angela; the jury returned verdicts for Dunton on state claims against Robert (battery) and Angela (malicious prosecution), including punitive damages.
- Robert sought a new trial based on conflicted representation; the district court denied the motion.

## Issues

1. Whether joint representation of Suffolk County and Officer Pfeiffer created an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected Pfeiffer’s defense and required a new trial on the battery claim.
2. Whether the district court could retain pendent jurisdiction over the state-law malicious-prosecution claim against Angela after the federal claims against her were dismissed as insubstantial, and whether the jury was properly instructed on malicious prosecution, including favorable termination.

## Decision

- The court reversed the judgment against Robert Pfeiffer and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held the County Attorney had an actual conflict: the County’s defense that Pfeiffer acted privately undermined Pfeiffer’s ability to argue he acted in an official capacity with a good-faith defense.
- The court found no knowing and intelligent waiver because Pfeiffer received only a general conflict letter and the trial court did not ensure an informed waiver.
- The court reversed the judgment against Angela Pfeiffer and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint against her.
- The court ruled pendent jurisdiction was improper because the federal claims against Angela were insubstantial and she was not shown to have acted under color of state law.
- The court further concluded the malicious-prosecution claim was mishandled because the jury instructions treated favorable termination as established despite dismissal on procedural speedy-trial grounds.

## Legal Principles

- Government counsel’s joint representation of a municipality and an individual officer in civil-rights litigation requires close scrutiny where the municipality’s best defense is to deny the officer acted within the scope of employment while the officer’s best defense depends on asserting official action and related defenses.
- An “actual” conflict exists when counsel’s litigation choices for one client materially foreclose a plausible, protective defense for the other client; adverse effect on representation warrants a new trial.
- A valid conflict waiver requires that the affected party be adequately informed of the nature and consequences of the conflict; a generic notice of possible conflict may be insufficient, and trial courts should ensure an informed waiver where the conflict is obvious.
- Pendent (supplemental) jurisdiction over state claims depends on the presence of a substantial federal claim; where the federal claim against a defendant is insubstantial, the federal court should not adjudicate purely state-law claims against that defendant.
- Under New York law, malicious prosecution requires initiation of proceedings, favorable termination, lack of probable cause, and malice; a dismissal on procedural speedy-trial grounds does not automatically establish favorable termination for this tort and must be properly presented to the factfinder.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit held that conflicted joint representation that advanced the County’s “private conduct” defense at the expense of the officer’s plausible defenses required a new trial for the officer, and that state-law claims against a private complainant could not proceed in federal court where the federal claims were insubstantial and the malicious-prosecution instructions improperly treated procedural dismissal as favorable termination.


Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1984)