## Facts

- A newspaper owned by E. Hulton & Co. published a column about English visitors at a Dieppe motor race.
- The column referred to a person named “Artemus Jones” as being “with a woman who is not his wife” and implied disreputable conduct, adding that such behavior was surprising for “a churchwarden at Peckham.”
- Thomas Artemus Jones, a barrister, shared the unusual name “Artemus Jones,” but was not a churchwarden and had no connection to Peckham.
- The defendants admitted their correspondent and editor believed “Artemus Jones” was fictitious, did not know the plaintiff existed, and had no intent to refer to him.
- The plaintiff presented witnesses acquainted with him who read the publication and understood it to refer to him.
- A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded £1,750 in damages.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed by majority; the defendants appealed to the House of Lords.

## Issues

1. Whether a plaintiff may recover for libel when the defendant intended to refer only to a fictitious person, but reasonable readers who know the plaintiff would understand the publication to refer to the plaintiff.
2. Whether a defendant’s lack of knowledge of the plaintiff and lack of intent to defame the plaintiff is a defense when the words are reasonably understood as defamatory of the plaintiff.

## Decision

- The House of Lords dismissed the appeal and affirmed judgment for the plaintiff, including the damages award.
- The court held it is no defense that the defendant did not intend to defame the plaintiff if reasonable readers would understand the words as defamatory of the plaintiff.
- The court accepted that identification may be proved by evidence that readers acquainted with the plaintiff understood the words, in context, to refer to him.
- The defendants’ subjective belief that the named person was fictitious did not negate that the publication was “of and concerning” the plaintiff in the eyes of reasonable readers familiar with the circumstances.

## Legal Principles

- Defamatory meaning and “of and concerning” identification are determined objectively: how reasonable readers, with relevant contextual knowledge, would understand the publication.
- A publisher may be liable in libel to an unintended and unknown plaintiff if the publication is reasonably taken to refer to that plaintiff.
- Lack of intent to refer to the plaintiff, and lack of knowledge of the plaintiff’s existence, is not a defense where the publication in fact identifies and defames the plaintiff as reasonably understood.
- A plaintiff may prove identification through witness testimony showing that readers who know the plaintiff connected the words to the plaintiff.

## Conclusion

The House of Lords held that civil libel liability does not depend on the publisher’s subjective intention to target the claimant; the controlling question is whether reasonable readers acquainted with the claimant and circumstances would understand the defamatory publication to refer to the claimant.


E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20 (H.L. 1910)