## Facts

- Two related federal diversity actions arose from an automobile collision on U.S. Highway 41 in Whitfield County, Georgia, around 2:00 a.m. on December 13, 1951.
- Elmer Ray Eaton drove a car carrying family members, including his mother (Lennie Ethel Eaton) and his sister (Mae Eaton Slaughter).
- Eaton attempted to pass a truck driven by J.D. Wooden while two Hoover Motor Express tractor-trailers approached from the opposite direction, the lead driven by Wade Moore and the second by Harold Bass.
- After Eaton completed the pass and returned to his lane, Moore braked; Bass braked behind Moore.
- Plaintiffs contended Bass’s truck had defective rear brakes that caused it to swerve or jackknife and strike Eaton’s car; Wooden’s truck then struck the Eaton car from the rear.
- Lennie Ethel Eaton and Mae Eaton Slaughter died, and Elmer Ray Eaton was injured.
- A key dispute was whether any brake defect on Bass’s truck was discoverable through ordinary care and reasonable inspection.
- At trial, a Hoover shop foreman testified about the company’s customary practice of inspecting and repairing trucks between trips, though he could not identify what inspection (if any) the Bass truck received before the trip.

## Issues

1. Whether testimony describing a company’s general and customary vehicle-inspection practices was admissible even though the witness could not confirm the specific inspection performed on the truck involved in the collision.
2. Whether, under Georgia statutes requiring adequate brakes and proper mechanical condition, the existence of a defective brake required a finding of negligence per se, or whether defendants could avoid liability if the defect was latent and not discoverable by ordinary care and reasonable inspection.
3. Whether the challenged evidentiary rulings and jury instructions required setting aside the defense verdicts.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit affirmed judgments for Hoover Motor Express Company and Harold Bass.
- The court upheld admission of the shop foreman’s testimony on routine inspection practices as relevant evidence of due care; any lack of specificity affected weight, not admissibility.
- The court held the jury instructions correctly stated Georgia law by permitting a finding of negligence per se only if the brake defect should have been discovered and remedied through ordinary care and reasonable inspection.
- The court approved instructing that defendants would not be negligent if the defect was latent and not discoverable through reasonable inspection, even if the brakes failed at the accident time.
- The court concluded substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings that defendants were not negligent and that Eaton’s negligence was the sole proximate cause.

## Legal Principles

- Evidence of an organization’s customary maintenance and inspection practices may be admitted to support an inference of due care, even if the witness cannot prove the practice was followed on the exact occasion; the inference’s strength is for the factfinder.
- Under Georgia law, violation of a vehicle-safety statute (including brake requirements) may constitute negligence per se when the defect was discoverable and avoidable by ordinary care and reasonable inspection.
- A latent mechanical defect that would not be revealed by ordinary care and reasonable inspection may preclude a finding of negligence per se and leaves negligence and causation for the jury.
- Appellate courts will not disturb a jury’s verdict supported by substantial evidence absent reversible evidentiary error or materially incorrect instructions.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit left intact defense verdicts arising from a multi-vehicle collision, holding that proof of routine inspection practices was properly admitted and that Georgia’s brake-safety statutes did not impose automatic liability where a claimed defect could reasonably be found latent and undiscoverable through ordinary care, allowing the jury to assign sole proximate causation to the plaintiff driver.


Eaton v. Bass, 214 F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1954)