## Facts

- Mario Echazabal applied for a position at an oil refinery owned by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Chevron).
- Chevron made the job offer contingent on a medical examination.
- Chevron’s doctors tested Echazabal and found abnormal liver-related results, concluding that chemical exposure at the refinery would seriously harm Echazabal’s liver.
- Chevron’s physicians were not specially trained in liver disease, but Chevron relied on their assessment and refused to hire Echazabal.
- Echazabal sued, alleging that Chevron’s refusal to hire violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
- Chevron defended the decision under the EEOC’s “direct threat” regulation, which permits excluding a person whose employment would pose a significant risk of substantial harm to the person’s own health.
- Echazabal presented testimony from liver-disease specialists who conducted additional testing and concluded that his liver function was normal and that refinery work would not put him at greater risk than other workers.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Chevron.
- The Ninth Circuit originally reversed on the ground that the “direct threat to self” regulation was invalid; the U.S. Supreme Court later held the regulation valid and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to decide whether Chevron satisfied the regulation’s factual requirements on this record.

## Issues

1. After the Supreme Court approved the EEOC’s “direct threat to self” regulation, did Chevron establish on summary judgment that refusing to hire Echazabal fell within the ADA direct-threat defense?
2. Did Chevron’s decision rest on an individualized assessment, based on reasonable medical judgment using current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence, including consideration of whether the risk could be reduced by reasonable accommodation?

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment for Chevron and remanded.
- The court held that genuine disputes of material fact existed as to whether Chevron met the regulatory requirements for the direct-threat defense.
- The conflicts between Chevron’s medical evidence and Echazabal’s specialist evidence created triable questions about whether Chevron’s risk assessment was sufficiently individualized and medically reasonable.

## Legal Principles

- Under the ADA, an employer may raise “direct threat” as an affirmative defense; the employer bears the burden of proof.
- The EEOC regulation defining “direct threat” includes a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual employee, not only to others.
- Before excluding an individual as a direct threat, the employer must make an individualized assessment of the person’s present ability to perform the essential job functions safely.
- The individualized assessment must be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence.
- The assessment considers: (1) the duration of the risk, (2) the nature and severity of potential harm, (3) the likelihood the harm will occur, and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.
- A good-faith or subjective belief that work is risky does not, by itself, satisfy the defense; the record must show a fact-specific, evidence-based evaluation.
- Evidence developed after the employer’s decision may still be relevant at summary judgment if it tends to show the employer’s medical judgment was not reasonable or was not based on the best available objective evidence.
- Where competing medical testimony and disputed facts bear on the direct-threat factors and the adequacy of the employer’s inquiry, summary judgment is improper.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit held that, although the ADA permits an employer to refuse to hire based on a “direct threat” to the applicant’s own health, Chevron was not entitled to summary judgment because the record contained material factual disputes about whether Chevron made the individualized, objectively supported medical assessment required by the EEOC regulation and whether the claimed risk was significant and unavoidable.


Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., 336 F.3d 1023 (2003)