## Facts

- Tom Edson, a real-estate investor, sought to buy a below-grade condominium unit in a Chicago building with the plan to lease it to a grocer.
- David Horwich, the seller’s real-estate broker affiliated with Prudential Rubloff, LLC, marketed the unit as commercially usable and told Edson it could operate as a grocery.
- Horwich represented that the unit was zoned “B1-3,” describing it as a commercial zoning classification; “B1-3” did not exist in Chicago’s zoning scheme.
- After Edson purchased the unit (through Chestnut Investment 1, LLC), he learned it was actually zoned residential, not commercial, preventing the intended grocery use.
- Edson and Chestnut sued multiple defendants, including Horwich and Prudential Rubloff, asserting common-law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and claims under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and the Illinois Real Estate License Act of 2000.
- Horwich moved for summary judgment, arguing Edson had no right to rely on the statements and that zoning statements were nonactionable statements of law.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment for Horwich and Prudential Rubloff on all claims and also granted a motion barring Edson’s late damages disclosure.
- Edson appealed the summary judgment and the damages-evidence ruling as to Horwich and Prudential Rubloff.

## Issues

1. Whether a private claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act requires proof of the plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentation.
2. Whether a private claim under the Illinois Real Estate License Act of 2000 requires proof of the plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentation.
3. Whether a broker’s representations that property has a specific zoning classification and can legally be used for a grocery are nonactionable statements of law, or actionable misrepresentations of fact supporting fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
4. Whether summary judgment was proper on the ground that Edson had no right to rely on the broker’s zoning and permitted-use representations.
5. Whether, after reversal, the trial court may reconsider its interlocutory order barring Edson’s damages evidence.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed summary judgment on the Consumer Fraud Act claim because the trial court wrongly treated reliance as a required element.
- The appellate court reversed summary judgment on the Real Estate License Act claim for the same reason and recognized that the statute imposes duties on licensees that may run to purchasers, including non-clients.
- The appellate court reversed summary judgment on negligent misrepresentation and common-law fraud because Horwich’s zoning and permitted-use statements were treated as material misrepresentations of fact, not merely statements of law, on this record.
- The appellate court held that the “no right to rely” rationale did not warrant summary judgment as a matter of law given the nature of the broker’s specific zoning/use representations and the surrounding circumstances.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings, and Edson was permitted to ask the trial court to reconsider the interlocutory order barring damages evidence.

## Legal Principles

- Illinois Consumer Fraud Act claims require a deceptive act or practice, intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception, occurrence in trade or commerce, actual damages, and proximate causation; common-law reliance is not a separate required element.
- The Illinois Real Estate License Act imposes statutory duties on real-estate licensees to deal honestly and to avoid knowingly or negligently providing false information; liability may extend to parties the broker did not represent.
- Although misstatements of law are often treated as nonactionable, a broker’s concrete representation that a property is presently in a particular zoning classification (especially where the stated classification does not exist) and is presently suitable for a specific legal use can be treated as a misstatement of existing fact for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
- Questions about whether reliance was justified, and whether the alleged misrepresentations caused the claimed losses, commonly involve factual disputes not suited to resolution by summary judgment when competing inferences are available.
- On remand after reversal of summary judgment, a trial court may revisit interlocutory evidentiary rulings, including an order barring damages evidence.

## Conclusion

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed summary judgment for the seller’s broker and brokerage after concluding that the trial court improperly required reliance for the Consumer Fraud Act and Real Estate License Act claims and wrongly treated the broker’s specific zoning and grocery-use representations as nonactionable statements of law; the court remanded for further proceedings and allowed the plaintiff to seek reconsideration of the interlocutory order excluding late-disclosed damages evidence.


Edson v. Fogarty, 138 N.E.3d 238 (2019)