## Facts

- Robert G. Rosberg acquired a Dallas County residential property through a settlement with Henry and Jack Effel in prior litigation.
- The settlement stated the current resident, Lena Effel, would continue to occupy the property for the rest of her life or until she voluntarily moved, and it contemplated a lease incorporating those terms.
- Lena Effel was not a party to the settlement, and the deed to Rosberg contained no reservation of a life estate.
- A lease was executed naming Rosberg as lessor and purporting to grant Effel occupancy for the remainder of her life (or until she vacated), while also imposing rent and maintenance covenants.
- The lease included a clause allowing the lessor to terminate the lease, at the lessor’s option, upon default in rent or other covenants.
- After Effel installed a wrought-iron fence in the front yard, Rosberg asserted the installation violated lease covenants regarding alterations.
- Rosberg sent Effel written notice terminating the lease effective immediately and demanding surrender of the premises within three days.
- Rosberg filed a forcible detainer action in justice court; the justice court awarded possession to Rosberg, and the county court at law affirmed after a de novo trial, characterizing the arrangement as a tenancy at will.
- Effel appealed, primarily arguing lack of jurisdiction due to an alleged life estate and error in awarding possession.

## Issues

1. Whether the justice court (and the county court on appeal) lacked jurisdiction over a forcible detainer action because Effel claimed a life estate or other ownership interest.
2. Whether the instruments created a non-terminable life estate or instead a landlord-tenant relationship allowing termination and eviction.
3. Whether Rosberg’s termination and notice to vacate were sufficient to support a forcible detainer judgment for possession.

## Decision

- The court of appeals affirmed the county court’s judgment awarding possession to Rosberg.
- The justice court had jurisdiction because determining immediate possession did not require resolving a genuine title dispute.
- The deed and related instruments did not establish a life estate; they reflected a lease-based landlord-tenant relationship.
- The lease lacked the definite term required for a term estate and, coupled with the termination-for-default provision, was construed as a tenancy at will or otherwise terminable tenancy.
- Rosberg’s termination and notice to vacate were sufficient to proceed in forcible detainer and to award possession.

## Legal Principles

- Forcible detainer proceedings determine only the immediate right to possession; justice courts lack jurisdiction only when possession cannot be determined without deciding a genuine title dispute.
- A claimed ownership interest does not defeat forcible detainer jurisdiction when the controlling documents establish a landlord-tenant relationship and do not require title adjudication to decide possession.
- A deed that does not reserve a life estate, combined with a lease structure, supports characterization of the occupant as a tenant rather than a freehold owner.
- A lease that does not provide a definite term and that permits landlord termination upon default may be treated as a tenancy at will or otherwise terminable tenancy supporting eviction after proper notice.

## Conclusion

The court upheld forcible detainer jurisdiction because no genuine title dispute was necessary to decide possession and held that “lifetime occupancy” language in a lease, without a deed reservation and with a termination-for-default clause, created a terminable tenancy rather than a life estate, entitling the landlord to possession after termination and notice.


Effel v. Rosberg, 360 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012)