## Facts

- Norman J. Pressman, a long-term DuPont employee and scientist, worked under supervisor David A. Pensak.
- Pressman confronted Pensak about an alleged conflict of interest.
- Pressman presented evidence that, after the confrontation, Pensak retaliated by restricting work privileges and manipulating Pressman’s performance record.
- Alleged retaliatory acts included negative evaluations (including an anonymous evaluation), underreporting or failing to forward positive reports of Pressman’s accomplishments, and failing to submit a report documenting substantial achievements.
- DuPont decided to terminate Pressman in April 1989; he left the company in June 1989.
- Pressman sued, including a claim that DuPont breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an at-will employment relationship.
- A jury found for Pressman on the implied-covenant claim and awarded compensatory damages plus emotional-distress and punitive damages; it rejected an implied-in-fact “good cause” contract theory and found for Pensak on defamation.
- On appeal, DuPont challenged the scope of the implied-covenant theory, the jury instructions, and the availability of punitive and emotional-distress damages; Pressman cross-appealed an evidentiary ruling.

## Issues

1. Whether Delaware’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing limits at-will employment and, if so, under what circumstances.
2. Whether jury instructions improperly permitted implied-covenant liability based on malice or general “bad faith,” rather than deceitful fabrication of false termination grounds.
3. Whether punitive damages and emotional-distress damages are available for breach of an employment contract, including breach of the implied covenant.
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in challenged evidentiary rulings.

## Decision

- The court reaffirmed that Delaware’s employment-at-will doctrine is broad and generally permits termination without cause and regardless of motive, subject to narrow exceptions.
- The court held the implied covenant applies in at-will employment only in a narrow category: where an employer’s agent commits deceitful acts that manufacture materially false grounds for dismissal.
- The court reversed because the jury instructions overstated the implied covenant by allowing liability based on malice, ill will, or generalized “bad faith” without requiring deceitful manufacture of false grounds.
- The court held punitive damages and emotional-distress damages were unavailable for breach of an employment contract on the facts presented.
- The court affirmed the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, finding no abuse of discretion.
- Disposition: affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial on the implied-covenant claim under the narrowed standard and with remedies limited to contract damages.

## Legal Principles

- At-will employment in Delaware permits termination without cause and regardless of motive, absent a recognized, narrowly defined limitation.
- The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support an at-will employment claim only when an employer (through its agent) engages in deceitful conduct that manufactures materially false grounds for termination.
- Malice, ill will, or generalized “bad faith” alone does not establish breach of the implied covenant in an at-will employment relationship.
- Punitive damages and emotional-distress damages are generally not recoverable for breach of an employment contract, including breach of the implied covenant, absent exceptional circumstances not shown.

## Conclusion

The Delaware Supreme Court confined implied-covenant liability in at-will employment to fraud-like conduct that fabricates false grounds for dismissal, vacated punitive and emotional-distress awards as improper contract remedies, and ordered a new trial because the jury was instructed under an overly broad “bad faith” standard.


E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996)