## Facts

- Queen Ellis owned approximately forty acres of land in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina.
- Queen had several children, including Clara Ellis Vespoint (defendant) and M.B. “Pete” Ellis, Earl D. Ellis, Arthur F. Ellis, Frank D. Ellis, Dorothy Ellis Hall, Jessie Ellis Grimm, and Margaret Ellis Mondozzi (plaintiffs).
- In January 1962, Clara, Pete, and Frank approached Queen seeking help obtaining $5,000 for business equipment for a venture involving Frank, Pete, and Clara’s husband.
- After discussions among Queen, Clara, Pete, and Frank, they agreed Queen would deed the land to Clara so Clara could borrow money using the land as collateral; the siblings believed title should be in Clara because she was “the wisest of the three children.”
- Frank and Pete testified that, before the deed transfer, Clara promised Queen she would (1) take title to the land, (2) make sure the loan was repaid, and (3) if anything happened to Queen, divide the land equally among all of Queen’s children.
- Queen deeded the property to Clara, who obtained the loan secured by the land and repaid it.
- Queen remained on the land until her death in 1972.
- From 1962 until Queen’s death, Clara paid the property taxes, made general repairs, and received farming income from the property.
- Frank testified that in 1982 or 1983 Clara told him the land would remain in the Ellis family.
- In June 1988, a boundary dispute between plaintiff Earl Ellis and Clara’s son triggered the siblings’ inquiry into ownership; Clara denied any oral trust.
- The plaintiffs sued to establish an express parol (oral) trust in the land and to vest title in them. Over Clara’s objection, the trial court allowed Frank to testify about the pre-transfer discussions even though he could not state the exact date of the conversation, only that it occurred before the transfer.
- Clara moved for a directed verdict, arguing (1) insufficient evidence of Queen’s intent to create a trust and (2) failure to prove fraud, mistake, or undue influence. The trial court denied the motion; the jury found for plaintiffs; judgment vested title in plaintiffs; Clara appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by admitting Frank Ellis’s testimony about the trust discussions when he could not identify the exact date of the conversation, and in light of the parties’ stipulation limiting testimony about Queen Ellis’s statements.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to submit to the jury the existence and terms of an express parol trust in land under the clear, cogent, and convincing standard.
3. Whether plaintiffs were required to prove fraud, mistake, or undue influence to enforce an alleged parol trust that benefitted third-party beneficiaries (the grantor’s children).
4. Whether Clara preserved appellate review of her directed-verdict challenge after presenting evidence following denial of her motion at the close of plaintiffs’ case.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment vesting title in the plaintiffs.
- The court held Frank’s testimony about the pre-transfer discussions was properly admitted; his inability to supply an exact date affected weight, not admissibility, because he testified the discussion occurred before the deed transfer.
- The court held Clara waived review of her directed-verdict motion made at the close of plaintiffs’ evidence by proceeding to present her own evidence without properly renewing the motion at the close of all the evidence.
- Even considering the sufficiency arguments, the court held the plaintiffs’ evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to them, permitted a jury to find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that Queen intended a trust for the benefit of all her children when she deeded the land to Clara.
- The court rejected Clara’s argument that plaintiffs had to prove fraud, mistake, or undue influence because the alleged trust was for the benefit of third parties, not for the grantor’s own benefit.

## Legal Principles

- An express parol trust in real property may be established by parol evidence, including an “A to B to hold for C” arrangement.
- The existence and terms of an express parol trust in land must be proven by evidence that is clear, cogent, and convincing; a preponderance of the evidence is not enough.
- When the alleged parol trust is created at the time of conveyance for third-party beneficiaries, enforcement does not require proof of fraud, mistake, or undue influence; the question is whether the grantor intended to create the trust.
- A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the opponent’s evidence and then introduces evidence waives the motion unless it is renewed at the close of all the evidence.
- A witness’s inability to state the precise date of a relevant conversation does not necessarily bar the testimony where the witness can place it in relation to the transaction; the timing uncertainty generally goes to credibility and weight for the jury.

## Conclusion

Ellis v. Vespoint affirmed a judgment enforcing an alleged oral trust arising from a mother’s deed of land to one child so the child could secure a loan, where testimony supported that the grantee promised to repay the loan and later divide the land equally among all siblings; the court held the evidence was sufficient under the clear, cogent, and convincing standard, plaintiffs did not need to prove fraud, mistake, or undue influence because the trust benefited third parties, and the defendant waived her directed-verdict motion by presenting evidence without proper renewal.


Ellis v. Vespoint, 403 S.E.2d 542, 102 N.C. App. 739 (1991)