## Facts

- A nighttime collision occurred in October 1978 in the Chesapeake Bay between the U.S. Coast Guard cutter *Cuyahoga* (northbound) and the Argentinian freighter *Santa Cruz II* (southbound).
- The *Cuyahoga*’s commanding officer, Chief Warrant Officer Donald K. Robinson, observed the *Santa Cruz II*’s lights, checked radar, and mistakenly concluded it was a smaller vessel traveling in the same direction.
- When the vessels were about a mile apart, Robinson ordered a port turn to enter the Potomac River to moor; believing the turn would place the *Cuyahoga* astern of the freighter, he instead crossed directly ahead of it.
- The *Santa Cruz II* sounded warning signals; Robinson did not appreciate the danger in time, and the freighter struck the cutter.
- The *Cuyahoga* sank within minutes, causing eleven deaths; the *Santa Cruz II* sustained substantial bow damage.
- Evidence showed Robinson had months of respiratory illness and sleep impairment, had repeatedly sought medical treatment, and had recently been referred for specialty care; senior Coast Guard officers knew of the frequency and seriousness of his medical visits but did not investigate his fitness for command.
- The freighter’s owner sued the United States for vessel damage and for indemnity/contribution exposure to third-party claims; the United States sought limitation of liability to the post-casualty value of the *Cuyahoga* under 46 U.S.C. § 183(a).
- A first district judge found Robinson solely at fault and initially indicated limitation was available; before final judgment, that judge died. A successor judge reopened the limitation issue and denied limitation, attributing knowledge of Robinson’s condition to superiors in the command chain.

## Issues

1. Whether the United States, as owner of the *Cuyahoga*, could limit liability under 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) despite the collision being caused by the commander’s navigational negligence, where Coast Guard superiors knew or should have known of his debilitating medical condition affecting fitness for duty.
2. Whether a successor district judge could reconsider and change an earlier judge’s limitation determination when no final judgment had been entered.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit affirmed the order denying limitation of liability.
- The court held the United States failed to prove lack of “privity or knowledge” because the Coast Guard’s managerial personnel had, or should have had, knowledge of Robinson’s condition and its likely effect on his performance.
- The court held the successor district judge had authority to reopen and revise the limitation ruling because the earlier ruling was not embodied in a final judgment.

## Legal Principles

- Limitation under 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) is unavailable if the casualty occurred with the vessel owner’s “privity or knowledge”; the owner bears the burden to show the absence of such privity or knowledge.
- For an organizational owner, “privity or knowledge” includes actual or constructive knowledge held by personnel with managerial responsibility whose duties include addressing operational safety risks.
- Knowledge (or reason to know) that a master is medically unfit, combined with failure to investigate or relieve the master, can constitute owner privity or knowledge that defeats limitation, even if the immediate cause is the master’s navigational error.
- A successor district judge may reconsider interlocutory findings and legal conclusions before entry of final judgment, including on fact-intensive limitation questions.

## Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit held that limitation of liability was properly denied because Coast Guard supervisors’ constructive knowledge of the commander’s debilitating condition was attributable to the United States as shipowner, and the successor district judge permissibly revisited the nonfinal limitation ruling.


Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas S.A. v. United States, 730 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1984)