## Facts

- Two New York correction officers lived in on-grounds staff housing at a state correctional facility, paid monthly rent via payroll deduction, and furnished their rooms.
- The facility imposed institutional controls over the housing (e.g., inspection authority and guest restrictions), but the officers used the units as their primary residences.
- During a statewide correction-officer strike, the Governor declared an emergency and activated the New York National Guard to operate prisons.
- The officers were removed from their staff residences without prior notice or a hearing, and National Guardsmen were housed in their rooms without the officers’ consent.
- The officers sued state officials and Guard personnel for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging (1) unlawful quartering in violation of the Third Amendment and (2) deprivation of a property interest without procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding the officers lacked a sufficient possessory interest to invoke Third Amendment or due process protections.

## Issues

1. Whether the officers had a sufficient possessory/tenancy interest in the staff housing to invoke Third Amendment protection against quartering soldiers in “any house” without the “owner’s” consent.
2. Whether National Guardsmen activated by the state are “soldiers” for Third Amendment purposes.
3. Whether the Third Amendment applies to state action through the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. Whether removing the officers from their residences without pre-deprivation notice and hearing violated procedural due process given the emergency conditions and available post-deprivation remedies.
5. Whether summary judgment was proper on the Third Amendment claim in light of disputed facts about the nature of the officers’ occupancy and control.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
- It reversed summary judgment on the Third Amendment claim, holding the officers alleged a substantial tenancy interest sufficient to seek Third Amendment protection and that factual issues made summary judgment improper.
- It held National Guardsmen are “soldiers” within the meaning of the Third Amendment.
- It held the Third Amendment is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
- It affirmed dismissal of the procedural due process claim, concluding that, given the declared emergency and the availability of adequate post-deprivation procedures, due process was not violated.

## Legal Principles

- Third Amendment protections are not limited to fee-simple titleholders; tenants and others with general control over access to a dwelling may qualify as “owners” whose consent is required.
- National Guard personnel activated by a state may be treated as “soldiers” for purposes of a Third Amendment quartering claim.
- The Third Amendment applies to state actors through incorporation via the Fourteenth Amendment.
- In emergency situations where pre-deprivation process is impracticable, adequate post-deprivation procedures can satisfy procedural due process.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit recognized that tenant-like occupants of employer-provided housing may invoke the Third Amendment against state quartering of National Guardsmen and treated the Third Amendment as incorporated against the states, while also holding that emergency conditions and sufficient post-deprivation remedies defeated the officers’ procedural due process claim.


Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982)