## Facts

- A medical-device designer, acting through his company, developed improvements to a catheter product and worked with a medical-technology company’s urological division.
- The parties executed confidentiality agreements in late 1994 and early 1995 concerning the catheter technology.
- The designer later sought to sell or license the technology; the urological division declined and indicated it was discontinuing the product line.
- In October 1999, the designer learned the product still appeared to be available through the company despite his not having supplied it for about a year, and he asserted the technology was his intellectual property and that any second-source manufacturing would require licensing/approval.
- The company promised to provide an explanation but did not provide one that satisfied the designer.
- In January 2000, the designer wrote again, stating his trade secrets had been divulged, expressing distrust, and threatening litigation if the matter was not resolved.
- The designer did not file suit until October 15, 2003, asserting contract, tort, trade-secret, and unfair-practices claims under Massachusetts law.
- The district court dismissed all counts under Rule 12(b)(6), principally on statute-of-limitations grounds and for failure to plead tolling facts; the designer appealed.

## Issues

1. When did the plaintiff’s claims (including trade-secret misappropriation and related tort theories) accrue for statute-of-limitations purposes based on what he knew or reasonably should have known?
2. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged tolling under fraudulent concealment (or similar doctrines) based on the defendant’s response and alleged non-disclosure.
3. Whether the contract-based and Massachusetts unfair-practices claims were timely and sufficiently pleaded, or merely repackaged time-barred allegations.

## Decision

- The First Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint in its entirety under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The court held the claims accrued no later than October 10, 1999, and, in any event, by January 6, 2000, because the plaintiff’s letters showed awareness and suspicion of unauthorized marketing and misuse of his technology.
- The suit filed on October 15, 2003 was outside the applicable limitations periods, including a four-year limitations period applied to the trade-secret misappropriation theory.
- The court rejected tolling based on fraudulent concealment because the pleadings did not allege the kind of affirmative deceptive conduct required, and the plaintiff’s own correspondence showed he was already on notice and threatening suit.
- The court agreed that the remaining tort and Massachusetts unfair-practices claims rose from the same core facts and were likewise untimely and/or insufficiently pleaded.

## Legal Principles

- A limitations defense may be resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when the complaint itself contains facts establishing the defense, including documents or allegations showing accrual and timing.
- Under Massachusetts accrual principles, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its likely cause; explicit contemporaneous communications can establish that knowledge.
- Fraudulent concealment tolling generally requires an affirmative act intended to deceive; mere silence, delay, or an unfulfilled promise to explain does not toll limitations once the plaintiff is already suspicious and capable of inquiry.
- A plaintiff cannot avoid statutes of limitations by re-labeling an untimely misappropriation or contract grievance as alternative tort theories or an unfair-practices claim when the claims share the same operative facts and accrual date.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed dismissal because the plaintiff’s own letters demonstrated notice of alleged misappropriation by late 1999 (and certainly by early 2000), making the 2003 lawsuit untimely; the pleadings did not support fraudulent-concealment tolling, and the remaining theories did not escape the same accrual and limitations defects.


Epstein v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 460 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2006)