## Facts

- Arlene Nagy worked as a legal secretary for Rinella & Rinella from January 1971 to March 1973 and from October 1973 until her discharge on July 10, 1974.
- Nagy joined Women Employed in March 1974 and opposed what she alleged were unlawful sex-based employment practices at the firm, including alleged discrimination in health insurance benefits.
- Nagy’s alleged opposition activity included joining Women Employed, recruiting other women employees to join, attending meetings, and publicly alleging sex discrimination.
- Plaintiffs alleged Nagy was discharged because of these opposition activities.
- Women Employed filed an EEOC charge on August 26, 1974 alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII § 704(a), including retaliatory discharge and alleged interrogation and threats toward other female employees regarding Women Employed membership.
- The EEOC filed an enforcement action, and Nagy and Women Employed filed a private Title VII action.
- Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing (among other grounds) lack of Title VII “employer” coverage, improper organizational charge filing, and invalidity of a right-to-sue notice signed by an EEOC Deputy District Director.

## Issues

1. Whether the firm qualified as a Title VII “employer” by employing fifteen or more employees, including whether associated attorneys should be counted as “employees.”
2. Whether an organization could file an EEOC charge “by or on behalf of” an aggrieved employee and other affected employees.
3. Whether a right-to-sue letter signed by an EEOC Deputy District Director was valid under Title VII and the EEOC’s delegation of authority.
4. Whether the retaliation allegations (discharge, interrogation, and threats tied to protected activity) were sufficiently pleaded to survive dismissal.

## Decision

- The court denied the motions to dismiss in both the EEOC enforcement action and the private action.
- The court held the firm could qualify as a Title VII employer because associated attorneys could be treated as employees for the coverage count at the pleading stage.
- The court held Women Employed could file a charge on behalf of Nagy and similarly situated employees under Title VII’s “by or on behalf of” language.
- The court held the deputy-signed right-to-sue letter was valid under the EEOC’s permissible internal delegation.
- The court held the retaliation allegations stated a claim under Title VII § 704(a) and were not procedurally barred on the grounds asserted.

## Legal Principles

- Title VII coverage depends on whether the defendant meets the statutory employee-numerosity requirement; individuals subject to the firm’s right of control may be treated as “employees” for that count.
- In determining employee status for Title VII coverage, courts may consider control factors such as assignment of work, salary determination, and supervision.
- An EEOC charge may be filed “by or on behalf of” an aggrieved person; an organization may act as an agent for an identifiable employee or group of employees.
- An EEOC right-to-sue notice is not invalid solely because it is issued by a delegated subordinate official where agency delegation authorizes the act.
- Allegations that an employer discharged an employee, interrogated employees, or threatened discharge because of protected opposition activity can state a retaliation claim under Title VII § 704(a).

## Conclusion

The court allowed both Title VII actions to proceed, rejecting dismissal arguments that the law firm lacked statutory coverage, that an advocacy organization could not file a charge on an employee’s behalf, and that a delegated EEOC official could not issue a valid right-to-sue notice, and holding that the pleaded retaliation allegations were sufficient under § 704(a).


Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975)