## Facts

- Ronald K. Erickson, unmarried and the father of three daughters, executed a will on September 1, 1988.
- Two days later, on September 3, 1988, he married Dorothy Mehring (Dorothy Erickson).
- The will directed payment of expenses and debts and left the residuary estate to Dorothy; if Dorothy predeceased him, the residue would be divided equally, 50% among Ronald’s daughters and 50% among Dorothy’s four children.
- The will named Dorothy as executrix.
- Ronald died on February 22, 1996; the Probate Court admitted the will to probate.
- A daughter appealed, claiming the will was revoked by the subsequent marriage under General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 45a-257(a) because it did not expressly provide for the contingency of marriage.
- In the Superior Court probate appeal, Dorothy sought to introduce extrinsic evidence (including drafting-attorney testimony) that the will was executed in contemplation of the imminent marriage and that any omission of explicit contingency language resulted from a drafting mistake.
- The trial court concluded the will provided for the contingency of marriage and dismissed the appeal, but it excluded the offered extrinsic evidence of intent and alleged scrivener’s error.

## Issues

1. Whether a premarital will “provides for the contingency of such marriage” under General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 45a-257(a) so as to avoid automatic revocation upon the testator’s subsequent marriage.
2. Whether extrinsic evidence, including evidence of a scrivener’s mistake, is admissible to prove the testator intended the premarital will to remain effective after marriage for purposes of § 45a-257(a).

## Decision

- The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial.
- The Court held the trial court should have admitted extrinsic evidence of the decedent’s intent concerning whether the will was meant to remain valid after the marriage.
- The Court held extrinsic evidence is admissible to show a scrivener’s mistake misled the testator into believing the will would not be revoked by marriage; if proven by clear and convincing evidence, such proof can establish that the will “provided for the contingency of marriage” under § 45a-257(a).
- The Court overruled prior Connecticut decisions to the extent they barred extrinsic evidence of scrivener’s error in this context.

## Legal Principles

- Under General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 45a-257(a), a will executed by an unmarried person is revoked by subsequent marriage unless the will provides for the contingency of such marriage.
- Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to determine whether a premarital will provided for the marriage contingency when the proponent claims the will’s failure to say so expressly resulted from a scrivener’s mistake.
- A scrivener’s mistake that materially misleads the testator about the will’s legal effect may be established through extrinsic proof, subject to a clear and convincing evidence standard.
- The clear and convincing evidence requirement functions as a safeguard for the reliability of formally executed wills while allowing correction when the document fails to reflect the testator’s intent due to drafting error.

## Conclusion

The court held that, in applying Connecticut’s revocation-by-marriage statute to a premarital will, the trial court must allow extrinsic evidence—proved by clear and convincing evidence—of the testator’s intent and any scrivener’s mistake bearing on whether the will was intended to remain effective after the subsequent marriage.


Erickson v. Erickson, 246 Conn. 359, 716 A.2d 92 (Conn. 1998)