## Facts

- Robert A. Sonneborn and Dorothy L. Sonneborn were married, and each had children from prior marriages.
- In August 2000, Robert and Dorothy executed mutual (reciprocal) wills. Each will left the maker’s property to the other spouse if the spouse survived, and stated that after the survivor later died, the combined property would be divided equally between Dorothy’s children and Robert’s children.
- The wills also included language stating that, upon the death of the first spouse, the survivor’s will would become “irrevocable.”
- Robert died in April 2003. At the time of his death, he held significant property in joint tenancy with Dorothy, including the marital residence and bank accounts.
- After Robert’s death, Dorothy executed a new will (June 2003) leaving her property to her own children.
- In October 2004, Robert’s children, Deborah D. Ernest and John P. Sonneborn, filed suit seeking (1) a determination that Dorothy’s 2000 mutual will was irrevocable after Robert’s death, (2) a constructive trust over assets connected to Robert, and (3) limits on Dorothy’s use or disposition of those assets (including selling the jointly owned residence).
- Dorothy married Thomas Chumley in December 2004 and later executed another will leaving her property to Chumley.
- In 2006, Dorothy sold the residence and moved the proceeds through accounts and into three certificates of deposit titled in joint tenancy with Chumley.
- The trial court determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to the requested constructive-trust and lifetime restrictions. Plaintiffs appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the mutual wills and the “irrevocable” clause made the arrangement enforceable during the survivor’s lifetime so as to restrict Dorothy’s ability to sell, spend, or retitle assets.
2. Whether a constructive trust or similar equitable relief could be imposed during Dorothy’s lifetime on assets traceable to Robert, including proceeds placed into joint-tenancy certificates of deposit with Chumley.

## Decision

- The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ attempt to obtain present, lifetime restrictions on Dorothy’s control of property.
- The court explained that, even assuming the mutual wills reflected an enforceable agreement, the children did not receive a current ownership interest in Dorothy’s property during her lifetime.
- The court held that the mutual-will arrangement (and its “irrevocable” language) concerned the survivor’s testamentary disposition at death, not day-to-day control or inter vivos transfers while the survivor remained alive.
- The court therefore declined to impose a constructive trust or other equitable restraints during Dorothy’s life based on the challenged transactions, including the sale of the home and placement of proceeds into joint-tenancy CDs.
- The court affirmed and remanded with directions for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

## Legal Principles

- Mutual wills may serve as evidence of a contract concerning testamentary disposition, but a will remains ambulatory; the contract (if proven) is enforced as a contract, typically against the survivor’s estate after death.
- Language stating that the survivor’s will becomes “irrevocable” upon the first spouse’s death is generally read as fixing the survivor’s plan at death, not as creating an immediate bar on lifetime sales, spending, or retitling.
- Beneficiaries named under a mutual-will contract ordinarily have an expectancy during the survivor’s life, not a present property right that supports injunctive control over the survivor’s assets.
- Absent clear contractual limits on inter vivos disposition, equity will not convert a mutual-will arrangement into a lifetime trust-like restriction on the survivor’s property.

## Conclusion

Ernest v. Chumley held that, even where spouses executed mutual wills stating the survivor’s will would become “irrevocable” after the first death and calling for equal division among both families’ children at the survivor’s death, the intended beneficiaries generally have no present right during the survivor’s life to block sales, spending, or retitling of property or to impose a constructive trust before the survivor dies.


Ernest v. Chumley, 936 N.E.2d 602 (2010)