## Facts

- Solomon Jesmer died on October 10, 1987; his will was admitted to probate and left his niece, Natasha Rohlev, $5,000.
- In August 1985, Rohlev moved from Colorado to Chicago and lived in Jesmer’s home while he was elderly and chronically ill.
- Professional nurses lived in or worked in the home; by the end of Jesmer’s life, three nurses were employed to provide care.
- Rohlev claimed she provided services from September 1985 until Jesmer’s death, including companionship, cooking for Jesmer and the nurses, shopping, cleaning, household management, mail review, and party planning.
- Rohlev worked full time at the University of Chicago starting in October 1985 and asserted she performed many tasks after work and, before a night nurse was hired, tended to Jesmer at night.
- Rohlev alleged Jesmer urged her to remain in Chicago and promised to “take care of” her in his will with substantial compensation for her services and personal sacrifices.
- Rohlev also alleged Jesmer promised to help pay to bring her mother to the United States.
- Rohlev supported her claim with testimony from Jesmer’s attorney, who recounted statements that Jesmer “owed” Rohlev and referenced paying her in an amount comparable to a nurse’s salary.
- The estate presented contrary evidence that Rohlev lived in the home as a family favor, that nurses performed the primary caregiving and much of the household work, and that Jesmer denied making promises of additional compensation or paying to relocate Rohlev’s mother.
- Rohlev filed a probate claim seeking substantial compensation for services and included a “loss of consortium”-type theory tied to her decision to leave her husband to care for Jesmer.

## Issues

1. Whether the record created a genuine issue of material fact on the existence of an express or implied contract requiring Jesmer (and his estate) to compensate Rohlev for services.
2. Whether the presumption that services rendered by a family member in a household are gratuitous barred Rohlev’s claim as a matter of law.
3. Whether the Illinois Statute of Frauds rendered unenforceable any alleged oral promise to compensate Rohlev, including by a testamentary provision, or whether the claim could proceed as compensation for services rendered.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment for the estate and remanded for further proceedings.
- Conflicting deposition and affidavit evidence created triable fact questions regarding Jesmer’s statements, the parties’ expectations, and whether Rohlev’s services were compensable rather than gratuitous.
- The family-member gratuity presumption did not justify summary judgment because it could be overcome by evidence of an agreement or mutual understanding of payment.
- The Statute of Frauds did not dispose of the case as a matter of law on the summary-judgment record because the claim was framed as compensation for services rendered and depended on unresolved factual questions.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; credibility disputes and competing inferences generally require fact-finding.
- A claim against an estate for services may be based on an express contract or an implied-in-fact contract inferred from statements and conduct showing a mutual understanding that services would be paid.
- Services provided by a family member in a household setting are presumed gratuitous, but the presumption may be rebutted by evidence indicating an intent to compensate.
- Oral assurances of future compensation, including by will, may support an inference of an agreement to pay for services or allow recovery for the value of services where the claimant performed in reliance on the arrangement.
- Statute of Frauds defenses may not be resolved on summary judgment when the nature of the claim (payment for services rather than enforcement of a specific devise) and the effect of performance depend on disputed facts.

## Conclusion

Because the evidence supported competing accounts of what services were performed, who performed them, and whether Jesmer intended to compensate Rohlev beyond a $5,000 bequest, the appellate court held that the existence and terms of any agreement were questions for the trier of fact and reversed the estate’s summary judgment.


Estate of Jesmer v. Rohlev, 241 Ill. App. 3d 798, 609 N.E.2d 816 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993)