## Facts

- Roscoe H. Liles executed a 1972 will leaving all his property to his wife, Mary F. Liles, if she survived him, with various relatives named as contingent beneficiaries if she did not.
- Roscoe and Mary separated in 1975; Mary filed for divorce and property division in 1976.
- Roscoe was served but did not answer or appear in the divorce action; counsel was appointed for him, but Roscoe did not participate.
- In 1977, the Superior Court entered an absolute divorce decree and ordered a division of marital property, including sale of the marital home and division of proceeds.
- In 1978, at an enforcement hearing, Roscoe appeared, raised no objections, and agreed to comply with the property-division order.
- About six weeks later, Roscoe died without changing the 1972 will.
- Mary petitioned to probate the will; Roscoe’s siblings and other relatives contested, arguing the divorce and property division revoked the will by implication and that Roscoe died intestate.
- The contingent beneficiaries argued that, if Mary’s interest was revoked, the will should operate as though Mary predeceased Roscoe so they would take under the contingent gifts.

## Issues

1. Whether, under District of Columbia law, an absolute divorce coupled with a court-ordered division of marital property revokes by implication a previously executed will leaving the testator’s entire estate to the former spouse.
2. If revocation by implication applies, whether the estate passes under intestacy or under the will’s contingent provisions as if the former spouse had predeceased the testator.

## Decision

- The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the probate division’s summary judgment admitting the will to probate.
- The court held that the divorce and accompanying court-ordered division of marital property revoked the will by implication.
- The court concluded that Roscoe died intestate, rather than under the will’s contingent beneficiary provisions.

## Legal Principles

- A will may be revoked by implication when subsequent events materially change the testator’s circumstances in a manner inconsistent with the continued operation of the testamentary plan.
- Under the majority rule, a divorce combined with a comprehensive property settlement or comparable court-ordered property division may impliedly revoke an “all-to-spouse” will executed during marriage, even absent a formal revocation or statutory provision expressly addressing divorce.
- When implied revocation arises from divorce and property division that defeat the marital-based testamentary scheme, the proper consequence may be intestacy rather than treating the former spouse as having predeceased the testator.

## Conclusion

The court held that Roscoe’s divorce and the court-ordered division of marital property impliedly revoked his earlier will leaving everything to Mary, rendering the will inoperative and requiring distribution of the estate under intestate succession rather than under contingent gifts in the will.


Estate of Liles, 435 A.2d 379 (D.C. 1981)