## Facts

- On October 17, 1974, Robert Stafford Spencer, then unmarried, executed a will leaving his entire estate to Sandra Jean Cantwell, identifying her by her maiden name and listing her Maui address.
- On December 28, 1974, Spencer married Cantwell.
- The will contained no clause stating it was made in contemplation of marriage or otherwise providing for the contingency of Spencer’s later marriage.
- Spencer died on January 10, 1975, survived by his wife (Sandra) and two children from a prior marriage.
- Sandra filed the October 17, 1974 will for probate.
- The children contested probate and sought a declaratory judgment that the will was revoked by Spencer’s post-will marriage under HRS § 536-11.
- Over the children’s objection, the trial court admitted evidence offered to show that, when Spencer executed the will, he already intended to marry Sandra (including a retirement-system beneficiary designation describing her as his “wife” and evidence that they met with a minister to set a wedding date).
- The trial court ruled the marriage did not revoke the will because Spencer intended to marry Sandra when he made it, denied declaratory relief, and admitted the will to probate.
- The children appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether HRS § 536-11 revoked a will executed before marriage when the testator later married the will’s sole beneficiary and the will contained no provision for the contingency of marriage.
2. Whether evidence outside the will that the testator intended to marry the beneficiary when the will was executed can prevent revocation under HRS § 536-11.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reversed the trial court’s order denying declaratory judgment and the order admitting the will to probate.
- The court held that HRS § 536-11 revoked Spencer’s will upon his subsequent marriage because the will made no provision for the contingency of marriage.
- The court rejected the trial court’s reliance on evidence outside the will showing Spencer’s intent to marry Sandra at the time he executed the will, holding that such evidence could not create an exception to the statute’s operation.

## Legal Principles

- Under HRS § 536-11, a testator’s marriage after executing a will revokes the will if the will makes no provision for the contingency of marriage.
- A will that simply leaves property to a person who later becomes the testator’s spouse—without addressing marriage in the will—does not “provide for” the marriage contingency within the meaning of the statute.
- Courts may not avoid statutory revocation by creating an intent-based exception grounded in evidence outside the will; the statute applies according to its terms.

## Conclusion

Because Spencer married after executing a will that did not address the possibility of marriage, HRS § 536-11 operated to revoke the will even though the sole beneficiary later became his wife, and the trial court could not rely on outside evidence of Spencer’s pre-will plan to marry to keep the will effective.


Estate of Spencer, 591 P.2d 611 (1979)