## Facts

- Pearl Phyllis Taff met with her attorney and gave oral instructions for a will.
- She directed that two of her late husband’s sisters receive specific gifts, and that no other members of her late husband’s family receive anything further.
- She instructed that the residue of her estate go to her sister, Margaret Aulman.
- She further instructed that if Margaret Aulman died before she did, the residue should pass to Taff’s own family—her blood relatives.
- Six days before executing the will, Taff wrote a letter to Margaret Aulman stating that she was leaving the residuary estate to Margaret and to Margaret’s heirs.
- The attorney drafted the will so that the residuary clause provided: if Margaret Aulman did not survive Taff, the residue would go to “my heirs.”
- Taff executed the will on February 28, 1961.
- Margaret Aulman later died before Taff.
- After Taff’s death, relatives of Taff’s predeceased husband (the “legal heirs” under intestate succession rules potentially applicable through former Probate Code sections 228 and 229) claimed they fell within the class “my heirs” and sought distribution of the residue.
- Taff’s blood relatives (including the children of Margaret Aulman) opposed the claim, offering extrinsic evidence: testimony from the drafting attorney about Taff’s instructions and the letter to Margaret Aulman.
- In an heirship proceeding, the probate court granted summary judgment for the blood relatives, finding Taff intended the residue to go only to her blood relatives (specifically, the three children of her deceased sister).
- The husband’s relatives appealed from the summary judgment.

## Issues

1. Is the phrase “my heirs” in the residuary clause reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, such that extrinsic evidence of the testatrix’s intent is admissible?
2. If extrinsic evidence is admissible, did Taff use “my heirs” to mean only her blood relatives, rather than the broader class of heirs that could include her predeceased husband’s relatives under intestate succession statutes?
3. Was summary judgment proper where the extrinsic evidence of intent was not meaningfully disputed?

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment.
- The court treated “my heirs” as ambiguous in context because it could refer either to a technical intestate class or, in ordinary usage, to the testatrix’s own family.
- Because of that ambiguity, the court allowed extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances, including the drafting attorney’s testimony and Taff’s contemporaneous letter.
- The extrinsic evidence showed Taff intended that, if her sister predeceased her, the residuary estate would pass only to Taff’s blood relatives and not to collateral relatives of her predeceased husband.
- Former Probate Code sections 228 and 229 did not require a different result, because the case turned on construing a testamentary gift (“my heirs”) in light of the testatrix’s intent, not on distributing an intestate estate.
- With no triable factual dispute on intent based on the evidence presented, the matter could be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment.

## Legal Principles

- The controlling objective in will construction is to carry out the testator’s intent as shown by the will, read in light of admissible evidence.
- A term like “heirs” does not always carry its technical intestate meaning; in a given will it may be used in a nontechnical sense.
- Extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding execution (including the testator’s statements to the drafting attorney and contemporaneous writings) is admissible when the testamentary language is reasonably susceptible to competing meanings.
- Intestate succession statutes function as default rules and do not override a contrary testamentary intent established through proper interpretation of the will.
- When the material facts relevant to interpretation are undisputed, construction of a will may be decided as a question of law, and summary judgment may be appropriate.

## Conclusion

In *Estate of Taff*, the court affirmed summary judgment distributing the residuary estate to Pearl Taff’s blood relatives after concluding that the phrase “my heirs” was ambiguous and, based on undisputed extrinsic evidence (the drafting attorney’s testimony and Taff’s letter), was intended to exclude relatives of her predeceased husband despite intestate succession provisions that might otherwise have included them.


Estate of Taff, 63 Cal. App. 3d 319 (1976)