## Facts

- William M. Thornton and his wife, Helen H. Thornton, acquired personal property while domiciled in Montana.
- Under Montana law at the time of acquisition, the property was William’s separate property, subject only to Helen’s dower rights.
- In 1919, the couple moved to California and brought the property with them; William remained domiciled in California until his death in 1929.
- William’s will treated the property as his sole and separate property and disposed of it accordingly.
- Helen petitioned in probate for distribution of one-half of the estate, claiming the property became California community property under Civil Code § 164 and Probate Code § 201.
- The probate court denied the petition and upheld the will’s disposition.
- Helen appealed; after her death, the executor of her estate was substituted as appellant.

## Issues

1. Whether California may constitutionally apply Civil Code § 164 to reclassify as community property personal property that was the husband’s separate property when acquired under another state’s law, solely because the spouses later became domiciled in California and brought the property into the state.
2. Whether such an application of § 164 violates due process by impairing the husband’s vested property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the California Constitution.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court affirmed the order denying the widow’s petition for distribution of one-half of the estate.
- The court held Civil Code § 164 unconstitutional and void insofar as it attempted to convert into community property personal property that was separate property under the law of the state where acquired, based only on a later change of domicile to California.
- The property therefore remained William’s separate property and passed under his will.

## Legal Principles

- A state may not, consistent with due process, retroactively disturb vested separate-property interests by reclassifying property acquired under another state’s laws as community property upon a later move into the state.
- Vested rights in ownership and dominion over property cannot be taken or materially altered by legislative redefinition that operates as a deprivation of property without due process.
- A change of domicile to California does not imply consent to statutory reclassification that would divest a spouse of preexisting separate-property rights.
- A statute that alters substantive property rights during life cannot be sustained merely by labeling it a rule of succession governing devolution at death.
- Personal property acquired as separate property under the law of another domicile retains that character after being brought into California absent a constitutionally valid basis for reclassification.

## Conclusion

California could not constitutionally treat foreign-acquired separate personal property as community property solely because the spouses later moved to California; applying Civil Code § 164 in that manner impaired vested rights and violated due process, so the widow was not entitled to one-half of the estate.


Estate of Thornton, 33 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1934)