## Facts

- Henry P. Zucker died on June 21, 1983, leaving a will that placed his residuary estate in trust.
- The trust directed the trustee to pay Zucker’s daughter, Pauline Riddle, $200 per month from income and, if income was insufficient, from principal, for her lifetime.
- The residuary clause then provided: “Upon the death of my daughter, PAULINE RIDDLE, this trust shall terminate and the balance of the principal and accumulated income, if any, shall be paid as follows: (1) one half to the Lutheran Home …; (2) one half to GEORGE T. FOREMAN and ETHEL C. FOREMAN, his wife, in equal shares, or to the survivor of them.”
- George T. Foreman and Ethel C. Foreman both died before Pauline Riddle; they were survived by their son, George T. Foreman, Jr.
- Pauline Riddle died on December 16, 1995, ending the life estate and triggering distribution of the trust remainder.
- At the audit of the trustee’s account in the Philadelphia County Orphans’ Court, the court awarded the entire residuary estate to the Lutheran Home on the ground that the Foremans did not survive the life tenant.
- George T. Foreman, Jr. filed exceptions, which the Orphans’ Court denied, and he appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

## Issues

1. Whether the remainder gift to George T. Foreman and Ethel C. Foreman vested at Henry Zucker’s death (so it passed through their estates to their heir) or was contingent on their surviving the life tenant, Pauline Riddle.
2. Whether the language “upon the death of my daughter” and “or to the survivor of them” imposed a survival-of-the-life-tenant condition on the Foremans’ one-half remainder.

## Decision

- The Superior Court reversed the Orphans’ Court’s decree and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held that the Foremans’ remainder interest vested at the testator’s death.
- The phrase “upon the death of my daughter” was read as setting the time of possession and payment, not as making the gift conditional on surviving the life tenant.
- The phrase “or to the survivor of them” was read as addressing survivorship between George and Ethel Foreman, not as requiring either to outlive Pauline Riddle.
- Because the will did not plainly show an intent to create a contingent remainder, the Foremans’ vested one-half share did not fail and should not have been awarded to the Lutheran Home.

## Legal Principles

- The testator’s intent controls will construction and is determined from the will’s language and overall plan, read as a whole and in light of the surrounding circumstances.
- Pennsylvania law presumes a testamentary interest vests at the testator’s death unless the will’s language plainly, manifestly, and indisputably shows an intent to create a contingent interest.
- Language that postpones distribution until after a life estate generally fixes the time of enjoyment (possession) and does not, by itself, delay vesting.
- A survivorship phrase such as “or to the survivor of them,” when applied to two named co-beneficiaries, commonly directs how the share is allocated between those two if one predeceases the other; it does not add a condition requiring survival of a third person (such as a life tenant) unless the will clearly says so.
- Courts will not infer a condition precedent (like survival of the life tenant) where the will does not state that condition in clear terms.

## Conclusion

The Superior Court concluded that Zucker’s will did not clearly condition the Foremans’ remainder on surviving Pauline Riddle; applying the presumption favoring vesting at the testator’s death and reading “or to the survivor of them” as a survivorship direction only between the Foremans, the court held the Foremans’ one-half remainder vested in 1983 and therefore passed through their estates to their son rather than shifting to the Lutheran Home.


Estate of Zucker, 761 A.2d 148 (2000)