## Facts

- Metropolitan Police officers observed Baker N. Everton yelling on a sidewalk while standing next to a bicycle at Georgia Avenue and Otis Place, N.W., in Washington, D.C.
- Officers noted signs of intoxication, including a strong odor of alcohol, bloodshot watery eyes, unsteadiness, and slurred, loud speech.
- Officers instructed Everton to quiet down, move on, and not ride his bicycle because he was intoxicated.
- Everton rode the bicycle anyway, nearly hit a small child in a crosswalk, then lost control and fell.
- Everton was arrested and later administered a horizontal gaze nystagmus test indicating a high level of intoxication.
- He was convicted in Superior Court of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol under D.C. Code § 50-2201.05 and appealed, conceding intoxication but disputing the statute’s application to bicycles.

## Issues

1. Whether a bicycle is a “vehicle” within the meaning of D.C. Code § 50-2201.05, making intoxicated operation of a bicycle a DUI offense.

## Decision

- The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
- The court held that a bicycle falls within the Traffic Act of 1925 definition of “vehicle” as “any appliance moved over a highway on wheels or traction tread.”
- The court rejected the argument that potential borderline applications required narrowing the statute, because riding a bicycle on a public street while intoxicated fits both the statutory text and the Act’s public-safety purpose.

## Legal Principles

- When a statute defines “vehicle” broadly (e.g., “any appliance moved over a highway on wheels”), courts apply that definition according to its plain meaning unless a limiting construction is required.
- The use of “vehicle,” rather than “motor vehicle,” may indicate legislative intent to cover non-motorized conveyances when the statutory scheme elsewhere shows the legislature knew how to draft narrower provisions.
- Hypothetical or marginal scenarios do not justify narrowing a clear statute when the defendant’s conduct plainly falls within the statutory language and aligns with the statute’s public-safety objective.

## Conclusion

The court held that the DUI statute applies to bicycles because the statutory definition of “vehicle” plainly includes them, and the public-safety purpose of traffic regulation supports covering intoxicated bicycling on public roadways.


Everton v. District of Columbia, 993 A.2d 595 (D.C. 2010)