## Facts

- Donna Page, a Black female employee, sued Executive Software North America, Inc., and individual defendants in California state court for employment discrimination. ()  
- Page alleged two federal causes of action and three state-law causes of action arising from alleged religious, racial, and gender discrimination, including that employees were required to study Church of Scientology materials and she was terminated when she refused. ()  
- Defendants removed the entire action to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California based on federal-question jurisdiction over the federal claims. ()  
- The district court, on its own motion, issued an order to show cause why the state-law claims should not be remanded and later remanded those three state claims to state court while retaining the federal claims. ()  
- In its order, the district court quoted and discussed United Mine Workers v. Gibbs and 28 U.S.C. § 1367, but gave no case-specific reasons explaining why remand of the state-law claims was appropriate. ()  
- Executive Software petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus compelling the district court to retain jurisdiction over the state-law claims, arguing misinterpretation and misapplication of § 1367 and lack of the required discretionary analysis. ()  

## Issues

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit had authority to review, via mandamus, the district court’s order remanding only the state-law claims in a removed case, notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)’s general bar on review of remand orders. ()  
2. Whether the district court clearly erred in remanding the pendent state-law claims without articulating a permissible ground under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and without performing the required, case-specific discretionary analysis. ()  

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit held that the remand order was reviewable because it was not issued pursuant to § 1447(c); the district court had retained jurisdiction over the federal claims, so the remand was discretionary and not for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or improvident removal. ()  
- The court determined that mandamus, rather than direct appeal, was the appropriate vehicle for review of the discretionary remand of pendent claims. ()  
- On the merits, the court held that where supplemental jurisdiction is proper under § 1367(a) (and not barred by § 1367(b)), a district court may decline or remand supplemental state claims only for reasons enumerated in § 1367(c)(1)–(4). ()  
- The court concluded that the district court clearly erred by remanding the state-law claims without identifying which § 1367(c) ground applied and without articulating case-specific reasons demonstrating an appropriate exercise of discretion. ()  
- The Ninth Circuit granted the writ of mandamus and directed the district court to vacate its remand order and reconsider the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in accordance with § 1367 and the opinion’s guidance. ()  

## Legal Principles

- Supplemental jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) when state-law claims are so related to federal claims that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III. ()  
- If supplemental jurisdiction is proper under § 1367(a) and not withdrawn by § 1367(b), a federal court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental claims only for the specific reasons listed in § 1367(c):  
  - novel or complex issues of state law;  
  - state claims substantially predominate;  
  - dismissal of all claims over which the court has original jurisdiction; or  
  - in exceptional circumstances, other compelling reasons. ()  
- A district court must articulate which § 1367(c) category (or categories) justifies declining supplemental jurisdiction and must provide case-specific reasons showing that its discretionary decision is grounded in those statutory factors, not in broader, free‑floating notions of discretion. ()  
- Remand orders that rest on discretionary declination of supplemental jurisdiction, rather than on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or improvident removal, are not issued under § 1447(c) and thus are not insulated from review by § 1447(d). ()  
- Mandamus is available to correct clear legal errors in discretionary remand of pendent claims when no other adequate means of review exist and when the error implicates the proper interpretation of § 1367. ()  

## Conclusion

Executive Software clarifies that district courts’ discretion over supplemental state-law claims after removal is cabined by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). When supplemental jurisdiction exists, a court may remand such claims only for the statute’s enumerated reasons and must explain its decision with case-specific analysis; failure to do so is clear error subject to correction by mandamus.


Executive Software North America, Inc. v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, 24 F.3d 1545 (9th Cir. 1994)