## Facts

- Exxon Co., U.S.A. (Exxon) operated a refinery in Baytown, Texas.
- On February 27, 1981, Exxon’s refinery released “catalytic dust” (particulate matter produced by an unnatural process) into the air.
- The dust settled over a wide area of Baytown and interfered with other persons’ normal use and enjoyment of their property; accumulations were observed at locations including a fire station, vehicles, and nearby residences.
- Exxon did not have a permit (and the emission was not made in compliance with a variance or other order of the Texas Air Control Board) for the discharge described in the charge.
- The prosecution was initiated by a complaint signed by A.R. Peirce, Director of the Harris County Pollution Control Department, and the State filed an information charging Exxon with causing or permitting the emission of an air contaminant that caused “air pollution” under Article 4477-5b of Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes.
- Exxon filed a motion to quash the information and motions to dismiss, arguing (among other things) that the information was defective for failing to allege a culpable mental state required by Tex. Penal Code § 6.02.
- The case was tried on stipulated evidence. Exxon was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of air pollution and fined $1,000.
- Exxon appealed, challenging (1) the absence of an alleged culpable mental state, (2) the statute as unconstitutionally vague, and (3) Harris County’s authority to initiate and prosecute the case.

## Issues

1. Does Article 4477-5b require the State to allege and prove a culpable mental state under Tex. Penal Code § 6.02, or is the offense strict liability such that the information is sufficient without a mens rea allegation?
2. Is the statutory definition of “air pollution,” including the phrase “interfere with the normal use and enjoyment of property,” unconstitutionally vague as applied in this prosecution?
3. May a Harris County official initiate a misdemeanor prosecution under Article 4477-5b, or does enforcement authority rest exclusively with the state agency framework in the Texas Clean Air Act?

## Decision

- The court held Article 4477-5b creates a strict liability offense; the State was not required to allege or prove a culpable mental state, and the trial court properly denied the motion to quash.
- The court held the phrase “interfere with the normal use and enjoyment of property” is not unconstitutionally vague; due process does not require more detailed wording to give ordinary notice of prohibited conduct.
- The court held Harris County could initiate the prosecution; the criminal enforcement of Article 4477-5b is independent of the Texas Clean Air Act’s civil-enforcement scheme, and a complaint signed by a “credible person” was sufficient.
- The conviction and fine were affirmed.

## Legal Principles

- A statute may define a misdemeanor offense without requiring proof of a culpable mental state when legislative intent shows the offense is strict liability, particularly for public-welfare conduct affecting health and safety.
- Although Tex. Penal Code § 6.02 generally requires a culpable mental state when an offense definition is silent, courts examine legislative history and statutory origin to decide whether the Legislature meant to dispense with a mental element for a particular civil-statutory offense.
- Where a criminal statute was transferred from earlier penal provisions without change, courts may treat that history as evidence that the Legislature did not intend the Penal Code’s general culpability provisions to add a mens rea requirement.
- A statute is void for vagueness only if its terms are so unclear that persons of ordinary intelligence must guess at its meaning or differ as to its application.
- When a statute allows conviction on alternative (disjunctive) theories, a defendant seeking reversal on vagueness grounds must show the conviction actually rested on the allegedly vague alternative.
- The phrase “interference with the normal use and enjoyment of property” has an established meaning in nuisance law and provides sufficient notice for criminal enforcement in this context.
- Criminal enforcement of Article 4477-5b does not depend on the Texas Clean Air Act’s allocation of administrative or civil-suit authority to the Texas Air Control Board; a violation is a misdemeanor properly prosecuted in county criminal courts.
- As with other misdemeanor prosecutions, an information may be based on an affidavit by any credible person; the affiant’s role as a county pollution-control official does not invalidate the complaint.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed Exxon’s misdemeanor air-pollution conviction arising from a catalytic-dust release in Baytown, holding that Article 4477-5b imposes strict liability, that the “use and enjoyment of property” standard is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process, and that Harris County could validly initiate the criminal prosecution through a complaint sworn by a credible affiant.


Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. State, 646 S.W.2d 536 (1982)