## Facts

- After Chicago’s handgun ban was invalidated, the City adopted the Responsible Gun Owners Ordinance to regulate handgun possession through a Chicago Firearm Permit (CFP).
- The ordinance required at least one hour of firing-range training as a prerequisite to obtaining a CFP.
- At the same time, the ordinance prohibited operating firing ranges within Chicago and broadly prohibited firearm discharge in the city, making it impossible for ordinary residents to complete the required training within city limits.
- Chicago identified two indoor ranges run by private security companies, but they were not open to the general public.
- Plaintiffs included city residents seeking lawful handgun possession, a business intending to open a firing range, and Second Amendment advocacy organizations whose members were affected.
- Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, alleging the range ban and training requirement violated the Second Amendment (and also raised a First Amendment theory based on training and instruction).

## Issues

1. Whether the individual residents, range business, and advocacy organizations had standing to challenge the firing-range ban and training requirement.
2. Whether the Second Amendment covers maintaining proficiency in firearm use, including training and practice at a firing range.
3. What level of scrutiny applies where a city conditions lawful handgun possession on range training while banning all public ranges within the city.
4. Whether plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction, including likelihood of success, irreparable harm, and balance of equities/public interest.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction and remanded with instructions to enter an injunction against enforcing the firing-range ban and related provisions.
- The court held plaintiffs had standing: residents faced direct barriers and potential sanctions, the range business was directly prohibited from operating, and organizations had associational standing.
- The court held range training and practice are within the Second Amendment’s scope because meaningful armed self-defense implies a corresponding ability to acquire and maintain proficiency.
- Applying a form of heightened scrutiny due to the severe burden on the core right recognized in Supreme Court precedent, the court required a strong public-safety justification and a close fit between means and ends.
- The City’s asserted safety and environmental rationales were found largely speculative and not sufficient to justify a total ban, particularly given available less restrictive regulatory options.
- Plaintiffs showed irreparable harm from ongoing constitutional deprivation; the balance of harms and public interest favored injunctive relief.
- The court did not rely on the First Amendment theory to grant preliminary relief.

## Legal Principles

- The Second Amendment’s protection of armed self-defense includes associated rights necessary to exercise it effectively, including training and practice to maintain proficiency.
- Courts evaluating Second Amendment challenges may use a two-step approach: (1) determine whether the activity falls within the Amendment’s scope; (2) if so, apply heightened scrutiny calibrated to the burden and its relation to the core right.
- When a regulation severely burdens conduct closely tied to the Second Amendment’s core, government must offer a strong public-interest justification and demonstrate a close fit; rational-basis review is insufficient.
- A total ban on an activity linked to exercising a protected right is difficult to sustain where the government can address risks through direct, less restrictive regulation.
- Ongoing deprivation of constitutional rights constitutes irreparable harm supporting preliminary injunctive relief, especially where damages are inadequate.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit ordered preliminary injunctive relief because Chicago’s ordinance conditioned lawful handgun possession on range training while simultaneously banning public firing ranges, substantially burdening Second Amendment rights without a sufficiently supported and closely tailored public-safety justification.


Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011)