## Facts

- Nancy O’Mara Ezold was hired in 1983 as a litigation associate at a large Philadelphia law firm on a partnership track.
- Early in her tenure, a department leader warned that advancement would be difficult because she was a woman and lacked certain elite academic credentials.
- Over several years, Ezold received generally positive feedback on diligence and professional relationships, but partners repeatedly documented concerns about her legal analytical ability, especially in complex litigation.
- In the partnership cycle at issue, eight candidates were evaluated; five men and one woman were admitted, while Ezold and one male candidate were not.
- The firm stated that it denied Ezold partnership because her analytical and complex-litigation skills did not meet its partnership standards.
- After the denial, Ezold resigned and brought a Title VII disparate-treatment claim alleging intentional sex discrimination.
- Following a bench trial, the district court found the firm’s stated reason was pretextual and entered liability judgment for Ezold.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence supported a finding that the firm’s stated reason for denying partnership (insufficient legal analytical ability) was pretext for intentional sex discrimination under Title VII.
2. Whether the district court improperly substituted its own assessment of Ezold’s qualifications for the firm’s judgment in a promotion decision involving partly subjective criteria.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit reversed the judgment for Ezold and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the firm.
- The court held the district court’s finding of pretext was clearly erroneous because the evidence, properly analyzed, did not support an inference of intentional discrimination.
- The court concluded that documented, recurring concerns about Ezold’s analytical ability supported the firm’s explanation and were not rebutted by the comparative evidence relied upon by the district court.
- Because liability was reversed, remedial issues and Ezold’s cross-appeal (including constructive discharge) were not reached.

## Legal Principles

- Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, a Title VII plaintiff must show not only that the employer’s stated reason is false, but that discrimination was the real reason for the adverse decision.
- Courts may not function as a “super-personnel department” by re-ranking candidates or replacing an employer’s nondiscriminatory professional judgment with their own views of merit.
- Subjective promotion criteria are permissible when applied evenhandedly and supported by evaluation evidence; subjectivity alone does not establish discrimination.
- Comparative-evaluation proof must account for context, including differences in assignments, practice demands, and the employer’s emphasized competencies; selective reliance on favorable comments is insufficient to prove pretext.
- Stray or temporally remote discriminatory remarks, without a strong link to the challenged decision, generally do not establish discriminatory intent in the face of substantial performance-based documentation.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit held that the record did not support a finding that the law firm’s partnership decision was motivated by sex discrimination, emphasizing that Title VII polices discriminatory motive rather than the correctness or fairness of professional promotion judgments and that the district court improperly second-guessed the firm’s assessment of partnership qualifications.


Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992)