## Facts

- Roger Fairley and Richard Gackowski, former Cook County Jail correctional officers, sued correctional staff, supervisors, the Sheriff, and Cook County alleging retaliation and a “code of silence” connected to reports of inmate abuse.
- After extensive pretrial litigation and multiple adverse defense rulings, Cook County and the Sheriff moved to recuse the presiding judge about two months before trial.
- The recusal motion cited the judge’s comments during proceedings and settlement efforts criticizing defense litigation strategy and the use of taxpayer funds.
- Alleged statements included that defense counsel were “lining their pocketbook with taxpayer money,” that plaintiffs were likely to win, that the judge would be “vocal” about a “misexpenditure of public funds,” and that the case was like “Vietnam.”
- The defense also pointed to case-management and evidentiary rulings, including allowing reference to the existence of related inmate litigation while limiting reference to its outcome.

## Issues

1. Whether recusal was required under 28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455 based on alleged personal bias or prejudice reflected in the judge’s rulings and in-court comments.
2. Whether the judge’s comments regarding litigation strategy, anticipated outcome, and taxpayer expenditures created an appearance of partiality requiring recusal under § 455(a).

## Decision

- The court denied the motion to recuse.
- Prior adverse rulings and case-management decisions were judicial acts and, without more, did not show disqualifying bias.
- The challenged comments, viewed in context, reflected frustration with counsel’s conduct and efforts to manage the case and encourage settlement, not personal animus toward a party.
- Defendants identified no extrajudicial source of bias, and the record did not show “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” making fair judgment impossible.
- An objective, reasonable observer fully informed of the context would not reasonably question the judge’s impartiality.

## Legal Principles

- Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), recusal is required when a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned from the standpoint of an objective, informed observer.
- Under § 455(b)(1) and § 144, recusal requires personal bias or prejudice; judicial rulings and ordinary courtroom remarks ordinarily do not satisfy this standard.
- Judicial rulings “almost never” justify recusal absent extreme favoritism or antagonism; the proper remedy for alleged legal error is appellate review.
- Remarks and opinions formed during judicial proceedings generally are not disqualifying unless they reveal deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that makes fair judgment impossible.
- Absent evidence of an extrajudicial source of bias, criticism of counsel’s tactics, predictions about likely outcomes, or comments about public expenditures typically do not require recusal.

## Conclusion

The court held that neither contested rulings nor strongly worded, on-the-record comments about defense strategy and taxpayer-funded litigation established actual bias or a reasonable appearance of partiality, so recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455 was unwarranted.


Fairley v. Andrews, 423 F. Supp. 2d 800 (N.D. Ill. 2006)