## Facts

- Parastoo Fatin, a native and citizen of Iran, entered the United States in 1978 as a nonimmigrant student and later studied in Philadelphia.
- In 1984, she applied for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act, asserting that return to Iran would subject her to interrogation, forced religious sessions, public admonishment, and possible jail.
- She reported past support for the Shah, refusal to adopt revolutionary symbols (including refusal to wear a veil at the time), and claimed the Iranian government viewed educated, relatively wealthy families with suspicion.
- She described family mistreatment in Iran, including harassment of her physician father by “religious fanatics” (later ending) and two cousins jailed for about one year.
- By the time of her appeal, she also relied on her feminist beliefs and objections to Iran’s compulsory veiling and religious observance requirements for women.
- An immigration judge denied asylum, withholding of deportation, and suspension of deportation; the BIA dismissed her appeal and ordered her to depart or be deported.

## Issues

1. Whether substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that Fatin failed to establish eligibility for asylum because she did not show a well-founded fear of persecution “on account of” a protected ground.
2. Whether, given the higher “more likely than not” standard, she was entitled to withholding of deportation.
3. Whether she qualified for suspension of deportation, including whether she demonstrated “extreme hardship.”
4. Whether “membership in a particular social group” could include Iranian women who refuse to comply with gender-specific laws for reasons tied to identity or conscience, and whether the treatment feared would amount to “persecution.”

## Decision

- The Third Circuit denied the petition for review and upheld the BIA’s denial of asylum, withholding of deportation, and suspension of deportation.
- The court accepted that severe punishment for “intolerable” noncompliance with Iran’s gender-specific requirements could, in principle, constitute persecution and could implicate a cognizable particular social group.
- On this record, the court held that Fatin did not show she personally belonged to such a group in the legally operative sense or that she faced a sufficiently individualized and severe risk of harm.
- Because she failed to satisfy the asylum eligibility threshold, she necessarily failed the higher standard for withholding.
- The court also upheld the denial of suspension of deportation for failure to meet the statutory “extreme hardship” requirement.

## Legal Principles

- To qualify for asylum, an applicant must show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution “on account of” race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
- “Persecution” requires more than burdensome or discriminatory conditions; it generally requires sufficiently severe harm or penalties, assessed in a fact-specific way, and not merely conditions widely shared by others in the country.
- A “particular social group” may be defined by a shared characteristic that is immutable (e.g., sex or kinship ties) or so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be required to change it.
- Gender-related asylum theories are legally possible when the feared harm is tied to a protected ground and the predicted penalties for noncompliance are sufficiently severe.
- Withholding of deportation requires a stronger showing than asylum (more likely than not that persecution will occur); failure to meet the asylum threshold ordinarily defeats withholding on the same record.
- Appellate review is deferential to the agency’s factfinding; relief is not warranted unless the record compels a conclusion contrary to the BIA’s.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit upheld the denial of relief, reasoning that although severe punishment for ideologically driven noncompliance with Iran’s gender-based rules could amount to persecution and could support a particular-social-group theory, the administrative record did not compel a finding that Fatin herself would refuse compliance in a way likely to trigger such severe harm or that she otherwise faced a well-founded fear (or clear probability) of persecution on a protected ground.


Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993)