## Facts

- Candie Felton and Roger Felton ended their marriage by dissolution decree that included a no-harassment provision.
- Candie petitioned for a civil domestic-violence protection order under R.C. 3113.31, alleging Roger assaulted, harassed, threatened, and intimidated her and her children.
- The trial court issued an ex parte temporary protection order barring Roger from approaching Candie and granting her temporary exclusive custody.
- At the full hearing, Candie testified to ongoing assaults during and after the marriage, including an incident in which Roger hit her, threw her to the floor, kicked and hit her, and attempted to strangle her until their son intervened.
- Candie also testified that Roger repeatedly called at night and, if she ended the call, would immediately come to her home and threaten her; she stated she feared he might kill her.
- The trial court denied a final civil protection order, reasoning Candie’s testimony was insufficient without independent corroboration.
- The court of appeals affirmed, concluding a protection order was unnecessary because the dissolution decree already prohibited harassment.

## Issues

1. Whether a court may issue a civil domestic-violence protection order under R.C. 3113.31 when a dissolution or divorce decree already contains a no-harassment provision.
2. What burden of proof governs issuance of a civil protection order under R.C. 3113.31.
3. Whether pleadings may be treated as evidence to prove allegations at a protection-order hearing.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded.
- The court held a decree’s no-harassment provision does not bar issuance of a civil protection order under R.C. 3113.31.
- The court held the petitioner must prove danger of domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence.
- The court reaffirmed that pleadings are not admissible to prove the truth of their allegations and may not be considered as evidence.

## Legal Principles

- Remedies under R.C. 3113.31 are cumulative: they are “in addition to, and not in lieu of,” other civil or criminal remedies, so a prior decree provision does not preclude a statutory protection order.
- A court may grant a civil protection order only upon finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the petitioner or the petitioner’s family or household members are in danger of domestic violence.
- A trial court may not impose a corroboration requirement that effectively raises the statutory civil burden above preponderance; credible testimony can be sufficient if it meets the standard.
- Pleadings are not evidence; allegations must be established through admissible evidence presented at the hearing.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that civil domestic-violence protection orders remain available even when a dissolution decree already includes a no-harassment clause, clarified that the petitioner’s burden is proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and directed that courts may not treat pleadings as evidentiary proof at protection-order hearings.


Felton v. Felton, 679 N.E.2d 672 (Ohio 1997)