## Facts

- A two-vehicle collision occurred around 11:00 a.m. on February 10, 1966, at Mile 351.2 of the Richardson Highway, about 12 miles south of Fairbanks, Alaska.
- Joan M. Ferrell drove northbound with Opal V. Baxter in the front passenger seat and Ferrell’s daughter Linda in the rear seat.
- Melvin S. Graves drove a southbound Mack tractor-trailer owned by Sea-Land, Inc.
- Road and weather conditions included icy spots, packed-snow tracks that affected lane placement, intermittent visibility of the centerline, overcast sky, and approximately 0°F temperature.
- The roadway segment was a right-hand curve with an eight-degree inward banking.
- The parties disputed fault and vehicle positions: Graves claimed Ferrell was speeding and straddling the centerline; Ferrell claimed Graves crossed the centerline and she braked and steered to avoid impact but skidded.
- A responding state trooper located the “point of maximum effect” several feet inside the southbound lane; a defense witness placed impact nearer the center of the road.
- Baxter and Ferrell sustained serious injuries; Linda’s injuries were minor; the car was heavily damaged and the truck only slightly damaged.
- Baxter and her husband sued Ferrell, Graves, and Sea-Land for personal injury and derivative damages; Ferrell and family asserted cross-claims against Graves and Sea-Land; Sea-Land cross-claimed against Ferrell for property damage.

## Issues

1. Whether violation of Alaska traffic safety statutes and regulations could be treated as negligence per se rather than merely evidence of negligence.
2. Whether it was proper to place on the statutory violator the burden of proving a legally sufficient excuse for a violation.
3. Whether refusal to give a separate “sudden emergency” jury instruction was reversible error.
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding or limiting proposed expert testimony on speed, point of impact, and accident reconstruction.

## Decision

- The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court judgment.
- The court approved jury instructions applying negligence per se to unexcused violations of qualifying traffic regulations when the violation was a proximate cause of the injury.
- The court upheld instructions placing the burden of proving an excuse for a statutory violation on the violator.
- The court held that the general negligence instructions adequately permitted consideration of emergency circumstances and that a separate sudden-emergency instruction was not required.
- The court found no abuse of discretion in excluding or limiting the proposed expert testimony.

## Legal Principles

- A court may adopt a legislative enactment or regulation as the standard of care in negligence when it is intended to protect a class of persons including the plaintiff, against the type of harm and hazard that occurred (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286).
- Unexcused violation of an applicable safety statute or regulation may constitute negligence per se, rather than merely evidence of negligence (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B).
- Statutory violations may be excused under recognized categories (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288A), and the violator bears the burden of proving an excuse.
- Trial courts have broad discretion in determining expert qualification and admissibility of expert opinions; exclusion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- A general instruction on reasonable care under the circumstances can sufficiently cover emergency conditions without a separate sudden-emergency instruction.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed a jury verdict finding Ferrell negligent and sustained the trial court’s negligence-per-se instructions, allocation of the excuse burden to the violator, refusal of an additional sudden-emergency instruction, and discretionary limits on expert testimony.


Ferrell v. Baxter, 484 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1971)