## Facts

- Alexander Findlay, a British Army lance-sergeant, developed post-traumatic stress disorder after combat service.
- After heavy drinking in July 1990, he held members of his unit at gunpoint, threatened to kill himself and others, fired shots into a television, then surrendered.
- He was charged with several civilian and military offenses and tried by court-martial.
- A convening officer (a Major-General) selected the charges, convened the court-martial, appointed its members, and appointed the prosecuting and defending officers.
- The court-martial members were serving officers subordinate in rank to the convening officer; some were in his direct chain of command.
- The convening officer also served as confirming officer with authority to confirm or vary the sentence.
- A civilian judge advocate advised the court-martial on law; some legal advice was given privately and was not always disclosed to the defense.
- Findlay pleaded guilty to seven charges; despite psychiatric evidence linking the conduct to PTSD, the court-martial imposed imprisonment, reduction in rank, and dismissal without giving reasons.
- The confirming officer approved the sentence without reasons; subsequent internal reviews occurred in private, were conducted by non-lawyers, relied heavily on the judge advocate’s recommendation, and did not provide public reasons.

## Issues

1. Whether the court-martial constituted an “independent and impartial tribunal” as required by Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2. Whether post-trial review procedures could cure any lack of independence or impartiality at first instance.
3. Whether the applicant was entitled to just satisfaction, including damages and costs.

## Decision

- The European Court of Human Rights held Article 6(1) applied because the proceedings determined a criminal charge, including sentencing after guilty pleas.
- The Court unanimously found a violation of Article 6(1) because the court-martial did not provide sufficient guarantees of independence and impartiality.
- The Court held that subsequent review procedures could not remedy the first-instance defect; Article 6(1) requires a compliant tribunal at first instance.
- The Court declined to award non-pecuniary damages, finding that the violation determination itself was sufficient just satisfaction and that the Court could not speculate on the outcome absent the violation.
- The Court awarded the applicant his costs and expenses in full.

## Legal Principles

- Article 6(1) requires a tribunal that offers sufficient objective guarantees to exclude legitimate doubt as to its independence and impartiality.
- Concentration of prosecutorial and adjudicative control in a convening/confirming officer—charging decisions, appointment of tribunal members, and post-trial sentence confirmation—can undermine objective independence and impartiality.
- Where tribunal members are subordinate to an official with significant control over the proceedings and outcomes, the appearance of independence may be lacking even absent proof of actual bias.
- Legal safeguards such as a judge advocate may be insufficient when structural features compromise independence, particularly if legal advice is delivered privately and not disclosed, weakening transparency and adversarial process.
- Non-judicial, closed, and unreasoned internal review procedures cannot cure a structural Article 6(1) defect at first instance.

## Conclusion

The Court concluded that the applicant’s court-martial system failed to provide an independent and impartial first-instance tribunal under Article 6(1) because of the convening/confirming officer’s concentrated powers, hierarchical subordination of members, and insufficiently transparent legal safeguards; later internal review could not rectify that defect.


Findlay v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 221 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1997)