## Facts

- In 1936, Louis F. Swift, Sr. executed a will creating multiple trusts, including the “Lydia Niblack Swift Fund” for his daughter-in-law, Lydia Niblack Swift, widow of his deceased son, Alden B. Swift.
- The will directed that, after Lydia Niblack Swift’s death (or if she did not survive the testator), the trust income would be paid to the “lawful descendants, then surviving,” of Alden and Lydia Niblack Swift, in equal shares per stirpes.
- The will likewise directed that, upon termination of the trust, the corpus would be distributed to the same class of “lawful descendants then surviving,” per stirpes, if Lydia Niblack Swift was deceased.
- Alden and Lydia had three children: Lydia, Nathan, and Narcissa.
- Nathan (a grandson of the testator) predeceased Lydia Niblack Swift and left one biological child (Nathan B. Swift, Jr.) and one adopted child (Martha Herriott Swift).
- After Lydia Niblack Swift died, the trustee paid trust income to the biological descendants but did not include Martha.
- Martha claimed she was a “lawful descendant” within the class gift, relying on § 2-4(f) of the Illinois Probate Act of 1975, which generally presumes class terms such as “descendants” include adopted children unless the instrument shows a contrary intent by clear and convincing evidence.
- The trustee filed a declaratory judgment action seeking construction of the will and direction on distributions.

## Issues

1. Whether § 2-4(f) of the Illinois Probate Act of 1975 requires an adopted child of the testator’s grandson to be treated as a “lawful descendant” under a trust created by a 1936 will.
2. Whether the will’s use of “lawful descendants,” construed in its textual and historical context, constitutes clear and convincing evidence of an intent to exclude adopted children, rebutting § 2-4(f)’s presumption.

## Decision

- The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the circuit court.
- The court held the adopted child was not entitled to share in the trust as a “lawful descendant.”
- The court concluded that § 2-4(f)’s presumption favoring inclusion of adoptees was overcome because the will demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, an intent to limit the class to bloodline descendants.
- The court treated the 1936 meaning and usage of “lawful descendants,” together with the will’s repeated lineage-focused language, as sufficient to show exclusionary intent without an express clause stating “excluding adopted children.”

## Legal Principles

- Illinois law presumes that class terms such as “heirs,” “issue,” “descendants,” and “children” include adopted children, including in instruments executed before enactment of § 2-4(f).
- The presumption is rebuttable; an adopted child is excluded if the instrument demonstrates a contrary intent by clear and convincing evidence.
- In construing donor intent, courts look primarily to the instrument’s language and the meaning the terms would reasonably have had when the instrument was executed and took effect.
- Historically bloodline-oriented terminology in older instruments—such as “lawful descendants”—may constitute clear and convincing evidence that the donor intended a bloodline limitation, even absent an explicit exclusion of adoptees.

## Conclusion

The Illinois Supreme Court held that the phrase “lawful descendants” in a 1936 will, read in historical and textual context, showed a clear intent to confine a class gift to legitimate lineal blood descendants; therefore, § 2-4(f)’s inclusion presumption did not extend trust benefits to the adopted child of the testator’s grandson.


First Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. King, 651 N.E.2d 127 (Ill. 1995)