## Facts

- The City of Atlanta employed African-American firefighters who suffered from pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB), a condition that makes shaving medically harmful and disproportionately affects Black men.
- The Atlanta Fire Department enforced a clean-shaven (no-beard) rule for firefighters.
- The City justified the rule on safety grounds, asserting that firefighters must use self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs) in smoke-filled environments and that facial hair can prevent an effective face-to-mask seal.
- The City relied on expert and occupational-safety guidance (including OSHA/ANSI/NIOSH materials) stating that respirators should not be worn when facial hair interferes with the sealing surface.
- Plaintiffs contended the policy limited their ability to perform full firefighting duties and harmed their employment opportunities; they proposed partial shaving limited to the sealing area but produced no evidence it would be comparably safe and argued it would still aggravate PFB.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the City on all claims, and plaintiffs appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the no-beard rule caused unlawful disparate impact under Title VII, or was justified by business necessity and the absence of an equally effective, less discriminatory alternative.
2. Whether the no-beard rule constituted intentional race discrimination (disparate treatment) under Title VII.
3. Whether the City violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to reasonably accommodate firefighters’ PFB while permitting safe performance of essential job functions.
4. Whether the no-beard rule violated substantive due process.

## Decision

- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the City on all claims.
- On disparate impact, the court accepted that PFB-related shaving restrictions can disproportionately affect Black firefighters but held the City established a safety-based business necessity and plaintiffs failed to show an equally effective, less discriminatory alternative.
- On disparate treatment, the court held plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that the policy was adopted for racially discriminatory reasons or that the safety rationale was pretext.
- On the Rehabilitation Act claim, the court assumed arguendo that PFB could qualify as a handicap but held plaintiffs failed to identify a reasonable accommodation that would allow safe performance of essential firefighting duties requiring SCBA use.
- On substantive due process, the court held the grooming rule was rationally related to legitimate safety interests and did not implicate a fundamental right.

## Legal Principles

- A facially neutral employment rule with a disparate impact does not violate Title VII if the employer proves business necessity, and the plaintiff cannot prove an equally effective, less discriminatory alternative.
- An employer’s safety-based justification supported by technical and regulatory evidence can satisfy business necessity for grooming standards in hazardous occupations.
- For Title VII disparate treatment, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (such as workplace safety) defeats the claim absent evidence of discriminatory purpose or pretext.
- Under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, an employer is not required to implement an accommodation that would prevent the employee from safely performing essential job functions or would compromise safety-related requirements tied to those functions.
- Substantive due process challenges to public-employer workplace rules generally fail where the rule is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests, including employee and public safety.

## Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit upheld Atlanta’s clean-shaven requirement for firefighters, finding that the City’s safety evidence established business necessity, plaintiffs did not identify a comparably safe, less discriminatory alternative or a reasonable accommodation consistent with essential job functions, and the policy did not reflect intentional discrimination or violate substantive due process.


Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993)