## Facts

- Matthew C. Flanagan worked for several weeks at a house connected to Jennie McLane’s family.
- Money went missing from the house and later reappeared.
- While the money was missing, McLane wrote a letter to a town constable stating the loss and her belief that Flanagan took it; she also wrote a similar letter to the mother of Flanagan’s helper.
- After the money reappeared, McLane wrote again to the constable stating the money had been found in a place she had not put it, that she would do no more about it, but that she remained satisfied Flanagan took it and returned it after learning he was suspected.
- Flanagan sued for libel based on the letters and for slander based on alleged oral statements.

## Issues

1. Whether the letters were made on an occasion of qualified privilege that rebuts the usual inference of malice from defamatory matter.
2. If the occasion was privileged, whether there was sufficient evidence of malice in fact to require upsetting a defense verdict.
3. What questions are for the court and what questions are for the jury in a defamation action involving a claim of qualified privilege.

## Decision

- The judgment for McLane was affirmed.
- The court held the letters were made on an occasion of qualified privilege because they were communications made in good faith to appropriate persons in connection with protecting property and reporting suspected theft.
- Because the occasion was privileged, the ordinary presumption of malice was displaced, and Flanagan bore the burden to prove malice in fact.
- The jury could reasonably find no malice in fact; the verdict was not against the evidence, and the trial court properly denied the motion to set it aside.

## Legal Principles

- Defamatory matter ordinarily carries an implied inference of malice, but that inference is rebutted when the publication occurs on an occasion of qualified privilege (good-faith discharge of a public or private duty, or protection of a legitimate right or interest).
- A “privileged communication” is not immune from suit; it shifts the burden to the plaintiff to prove malice in fact.
- The plaintiff may prove malice in fact from the face of the communication itself or from extrinsic evidence; proof is not limited to extrinsic evidence.
- Whether a publication is libelous per se and whether the occasion is privileged are questions of law for the court.
- Whether the defendant abused a privileged occasion by acting with malice in fact is a question of fact for the jury.

## Conclusion

The court upheld a defense verdict because the defendant’s accusatory letters were conditionally privileged communications to responsible parties about a suspected theft, shifting the burden to the plaintiff to prove actual malice, which the jury reasonably found was not shown.


Flanagan v. McLane, 87 Conn. 220, 87 A. 727 (1913)