## Facts

- Peter Tallman acquired title to the disputed premises in 1795.
- In 1805, Edward Griswold entered into possession under a warranty deed from a third party and held the premises adversely to Tallman.
- In 1811, Edward Griswold conveyed his interest to Abraham Griswold, who entered and remained in possession until suit was filed.
- Tallman died in 1815, and his title passed to his daughter (later Mrs. Fleming).
- At the time she inherited, Tallman’s daughter was an infant; she married in 1807 while still under age.
- In 1840, Mrs. Fleming brought an action to recover possession from Abraham Griswold.
- Edward and Abraham Griswold’s adverse possession was continuous for more than the statutory period before the 1840 action.

## Issues

1. Whether infancy and coverture, as statutory disabilities, tolled the limitations period for an action to recover real property.
2. Whether successive disabilities (infancy followed by coverture) could be combined to extend tolling beyond what a single disability would allow.
3. Whether the plaintiff’s 1840 action was time-barred given continuous adverse possession since 1805/1811.

## Decision

- The New York Supreme Court affirmed judgment for Abraham Griswold.
- The court held the plaintiff’s action was barred by the statute of limitations governing recovery of real property.
- The court rejected the argument that infancy followed by coverture could be used to prolong tolling so as to defeat the completed limitations bar.

## Legal Principles

- Disability “savings” provisions in limitations statutes for real-property actions are construed narrowly according to statutory text.
- When a cause of action accrues during a disability, tolling applies only as the statute permits for that disability and any specified post-disability period.
- Successive disabilities generally cannot be tacked to extend tolling unless the statute expressly authorizes tacking.
- Once the statutory period of continuous, open, and adverse possession runs (subject only to permitted tolling), the owner’s right of entry and action is extinguished, and the possessor’s title is secure.

## Conclusion

Continuous adverse possession for the statutory period barred the heir’s land recovery action, and the plaintiff could not extend tolling by combining infancy and later coverture absent statutory authorization for successive-disability tacking.


Fleming v. Griswold, 3 Hill 85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842)