## Facts

- A first-grade student, Darryle L. Davis (age 6½), regularly crossed a busy Brooklyn street at Park Place and Ralph Avenue to travel to and from P.S. 191.
- The City of New York, through its Police Department, operated a school crossing-guard program and regularly stationed a civilian crossing guard at that intersection.
- For the first two weeks of the school term, Darryle’s mother observed the guard’s daily presence and, relying on that protection, did not arrange alternative supervision for her child when she began working.
- On November 14, 1967, the regular crossing guard reported she was ill early that morning.
- Police Department regulations contemplated coverage when a guard was absent, including arranging replacement coverage (e.g., assigning a patrol officer) and, if coverage could not be provided, notifying the school so it could take protective measures.
- No replacement guard or officer was assigned to the intersection, and the school principal was not notified that the crossing was unmanned.
- While crossing after school, Darryle was struck by a taxicab and suffered severe brain damage.
- In a negligence action, a jury apportioned fault between the City and the taxi defendants; the City appealed, arguing it owed no actionable duty because police protection is owed to the public at large.

## Issues

1. Whether a municipality is generally immune from negligence liability for failure to provide adequate police protection because such duties run only to the public at large.
2. Whether a municipality that voluntarily undertakes a structured school-crossing protection program can owe a “special duty” to an injured child when the program is negligently carried out at a designated crossing.
3. Whether parental reliance on the municipality’s undertaking can supply the “special relationship” necessary to impose municipal liability.

## Decision

- The New York Court of Appeals affirmed liability against the City.
- The court reaffirmed the general rule that a municipality is not liable for ordinary failures to furnish adequate police protection because that duty is owed to the public generally.
- The court held that a municipality may be liable where a special relationship creates a duty to the plaintiff, even if the duty is ordinarily public in nature.
- The court concluded that the City’s crossing-guard program and related operational rules, directed to protect schoolchildren at designated crossings, plus the mother’s reasonable reliance, established a special relationship and thus a special duty to the child.
- The City’s failure either to provide substitute crossing protection or to provide notice enabling the school to protect children supported a finding of negligence in performing the assumed undertaking.

## Legal Principles

- Police-protection obligations ordinarily run to the public at large; a municipality is generally not liable in negligence for failing to provide adequate police protection.
- A municipality may incur liability when a special relationship creates a duty to a specific person or a discrete class, and the municipality negligently performs an undertaking within that relationship.
- A special relationship may arise where the municipality affirmatively undertakes a protective function for an identifiable class (here, schoolchildren at designated crossings) and a plaintiff reasonably relies on that undertaking.
- When municipal conduct induces reliance that leads a plaintiff to forgo other protective measures, the municipality’s negligent nonperformance may leave the plaintiff in greater danger than if no protection had been expected.
- Internal operational rules and procedures can evidence a specific undertaking and the steps required for reasonable performance (e.g., replacement coverage or timely notice when coverage is unavailable).

## Conclusion

The court held the City liable because it voluntarily instituted and regulated a school crossing-guard program for a defined class of beneficiaries and, when the designated guard was absent, negligently failed to provide substitute protection or notice, after the child’s mother had reasonably relied on the City’s consistent prior performance—facts sufficient to establish a special duty notwithstanding the general public-duty rule.


Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763 (N.Y. 1978)