## Facts

- The NYPD used a stop-question-and-frisk program that resulted in large numbers of Terry stops across New York City during the 2000s, documented on UF-250 stop reports.
- A group of Black and Hispanic individuals who were stopped under the program sued New York City and city officials in a federal class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging many stops were made without reasonable suspicion (Fourth Amendment) and that the program was carried out in a racially discriminatory manner (Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection).
- At trial, plaintiffs presented statistical analyses and other proof addressing how often recorded stops appeared unjustified under Terry standards and how stop practices varied by race.
- Evidence showed stops were concentrated in neighborhoods with large Black and Hispanic populations; Black and Hispanic individuals were more likely to be stopped than White individuals even in areas with many White residents; and force was used more often during stops of Black and Hispanic individuals than during stops of White individuals.
- Plaintiffs also introduced institutional evidence about NYPD policies, training, supervision, and discipline, including that the NYPD had been warned as early as 1999 that stop practices were being carried out in a racially discriminatory way.
- Rather than meaningfully correcting problems, the NYPD increased pressure on officers to make stops and instructed officers to stop “the right people,” which, in practice, meant targeting groups most commonly named in local crime complaints—often young Black and Hispanic men.
- The court also analyzed several individual stops described at trial as examples of how stops and frisks occurred on the street and whether they met constitutional requirements.

## Issues

1. Whether the NYPD’s stop practices resulted in stops and frisks lacking the reasonable, articulable suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment under *Terry v. Ohio*.
2. Whether the City, through NYPD practices and directives, intentionally discriminated on the basis of race in conducting stops, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. Whether the proven constitutional violations were attributable to a City policy, practice, or custom (or deliberate indifference in training, supervision, monitoring, or discipline) sufficient to impose municipal liability under *Monell v. Department of Social Services*.

## Decision

- The court held that New York City was liable under § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations because the NYPD engaged in a widespread practice of making stops and, at times, frisks without the individualized reasonable suspicion required by *Terry*.
- The court held that New York City was liable for violating the Equal Protection Clause because the NYPD’s stop practices were carried out with intentional race-based discrimination against Black and Hispanic individuals.
- The court found municipal liability under *Monell* based on proof that unconstitutional stops and race-based enforcement were linked to City policies and practices, including pressure to increase stops, direction to target “the right people,” and failures in supervision, monitoring, training, and discipline despite notice of problems.
- The opinion at 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 addressed liability; the court issued remedial relief in a companion decision the same day (959 F. Supp. 2d 668), ordering reforms and appointment of a monitor.

## Legal Principles

- A Terry stop is a seizure that must be supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity; a frisk requires reasonable suspicion the person is armed and dangerous.
- Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific facts and rational inferences; generalized claims such as presence in a “high-crime area” or vague “furtive movements,” without more, do not satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
- Equal Protection is violated by intentional discrimination in policing; disparate impact evidence may support an inference of intent when combined with proof of official direction, patterns of conduct, and awareness of discriminatory effects.
- A municipality is liable under *Monell* only if the constitutional violation was caused by an official policy, a widespread practice that functions as policy, or deliberate indifference in training, supervision, monitoring, or discipline.
- Notice of recurring constitutional violations, followed by failure to implement effective corrective measures, can support a finding of deliberate indifference and municipal causation.

## Conclusion

In *Floyd v. City of New York*, the district court found after a bench trial that the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk practices frequently lacked the reasonable suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment and were carried out with intentional racial discrimination against Black and Hispanic New Yorkers, and it held the City liable under *Monell* based on evidence linking these violations to City policies, pressure on officers, and failures in oversight despite long-standing warnings.


Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540 (2013)